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INTRODUCTION 
 
In October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the dangerous game 
of nuclear brinksmanship. For the next two weeks, both countries went to their highest military 
alert levels, and it seemed likely that both countries would go to war, with the probability of 
nuclear exchange greater than ever before. In the months preceding the crisis, US intelligence 
sought to discover the true nature of the Soviet buildup in Cuba, while their Soviet counterpart 
tried to keep that buildup secret as long as possible. The Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), John McCone, was one of the first government officials that discovered the large 
military buildup underway in Cuba. Because of his own personal beliefs about communism and 
his experiences with nuclear power, McCone led a personal effort to convince members of the 
intelligence community and the Kennedy administration that the Soviets might take such a risk 
and place nuclear weapons in Cuba. During the crisis, McCone was one of the intelligence 
officials responsible for briefing the Kennedy administration on the Soviet efforts in Cuba. After 
the crisis subsided, McCone provided Kennedy with confirmation that the Soviets had begun 
removal of the missiles, officially ending the crisis. John McCone‟s role in the crisis is one of the 
key facets to understanding the reasons of the crisis and its outcome. 
 Because of the declassification of government documents and memoirs from the 
participants, historians have a wide range of documentation for their studies. Most historians 
focused on the reasons why the crisis happened, and the role of government officials in his 
outcome. However, even with the massive data available on the crisis, extensive studies on 
President John Kennedy, his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and several other 
advisors overshadowed McCone‟s role in the Cuban Missile Crisis. In most historical works, 
McCone received little attention before or during the crisis. Even in the most detailed works, 
2 
 
historians viewed his role as secondary to the crisis. Because of McCone‟s efforts, the U.S. 
intelligence community found the missiles before they were completed, and the government had 
the most recent intelligence it needed to make informed decisions during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. 
 McCone maintained throughout the summer and fall of 1962 that the Soviet Union might 
place nuclear weapons into Cuba.
1
 Part of the reason for this hypothesis was the correct 
assumption that the placement of missiles into Cuba gave Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev a 
way to counter the growing American nuclear superiority, and protect the communist 
government on Cuba.
2
 McCone made his concerns clear to President Kennedy and other 
members of the administration before leaving on his honeymoon in late August 1962. During his 
honeymoon, he called for more reconnaissance flights over Cuba, empowering his deputy, 
General Marshall Carter, to continue his efforts in Washington. When he returned from his 
honeymoon, he found gaps in the reconnaissance over western portions of Cuba, and pushed for 
more reconnaissance flights.
3
 On the final of those authorized flights, October 14, the 
reconnaissance flights found the missiles. McCone‟s “crusade”4 during the summer and fall of 
1962 was a primary reason for the early discovery of the missiles. 
At the start of the crisis, McCone delegated many of his responsibilities to his 
subordinates, and created a committee composed of several intelligence groups to deliver daily 
intelligence recommendations based on the daily reconnaissance flights. Continuing his crusade 
against Castro, McCone joined several prominent members of the Executive Committee 
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(EXCOMM) proposing a surgical strike against missile sites followed by an invasion.
5
 Despite 
his push for air strikes even during the blockade, McCone had the job of briefing the 
administration on the intelligence reports, keeping Kennedy and his cabinet informed on the 
Soviet military buildup in Cuba.
6
 Despite his emotional calls for attacks on Cuba, McCone‟s 
efforts to combine the intelligence reports, analysis, and photo interpretation branches during the 
crisis allowed the president to have a detailed picture on the withdrawal of the missiles, and 
allowed him to make informed decisions when dealing with the Soviet government.
7
   
After Kennedy made the decision to blockade Cuba, McCone utilized the committees he 
organized during the first week of the crisis to bring detailed intelligence reports on the 
construction efforts in Cuba and the status of Soviet ships bound for Cuba. He also had the 
important task of briefing members of the press and Congress on the situation, and provided 
deputies to answer questions during the UN talks, despite his personal belief that the talks hurt 
the diplomatic standing of the United States. When the crisis weakened his emotional state, he 
urged caution during EXCOMM deliberations, and requested that his deputies prepare daily 
memorandums combining the evaluations of the joint committees and other CIA intelligence 
reports. After Khrushchev authorized the removal of the missiles in Cuba, Kennedy, under 
intense pressure from Congress and public, relied on the CIA Director for analysis on whether 
the missiles had indeed left Cuba. McCone gave the administration the conclusions of the 
analysts and committees studying the Soviet withdrawal, concluding that the Soviet Union 
dismantled and shipped the missiles back to the Soviet Union.
8
 Again, McCone had the 
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important role of giving Kennedy the evidence he needed that the missiles were in fact leaving 
Cuba, officially ending the crisis.
9
 
After the crisis subsided at the end of 1962, American historians began searching for the 
reasons why the events took place as they did. In the years immediately following the crisis, 
historians focused on what happened before and after, asking why the events happened and why 
the government failed to prevent the crisis. Without classified government documents, historians 
used their own experiences, evidence available at the time, and previous surprise attacks to prove 
or disprove that the government could have prevented the crisis, or defend the government‟s 
actions before and during the crisis.
10
 In the 1970s and 1980s, several historians used emerging 
primary evidence from personal memoirs, actual intelligence training, and newly declassified 
documents to shed light on the events, methods, and problems facing an earlier detection of 
Soviet intentions in Cuba.
11
 Since the 1990s, both the U.S. and Russia declassified many Cold 
War documents, creating resurgence in scholarship on the crisis. These archives led many 
historians to re-evaluate interpretations of events. These new historians focused more on the 
mindset of the U.S. government during the crisis, Soviet motivations for the introduction of 
missiles into Cuba, and the intelligence efforts to keep that introduction a secret from the 
Americans.
12
 This new scholarship inspires other historians to focus on evaluating the mindset of 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frus.html (accessed June 30, 2010). See also “Memorandum for the 
Director, “Your Briefings of the NSC Executive Committee, 3 November 1962,” in Mary McAuliffe, CIA 
Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992), 353-355. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Roberta Wohlstetter, “Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight”, Foreign Affairs XLIII (July 1965): 690-
707. See also Theodore “Ted” Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harpers and Row, 1965), 663-673. 
11
 Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1974), 
306-312. See also McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the bomb in the First Fifty Years (New 
York: Random House, 1988), 415-420.  
12
 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 163-220. See 
also Roger Hilsman, Cuban Missile Crisis: A Struggle Over Policy (Westport: Praegar, 1996), 18-66.  
5 
 
the analysts in the U.S. intelligence community.
13
 Other historians used the massive amount of 
primary evidence in the post-Cold War era to make dramatic narrative histories of the Crisis.
14
 
However, even with the number of works produced on the crisis, historians produced no 
encompassing work on the importance of McCone‟s participation. 
One of the reasons McCone has a secondary role in the majority of histories is the lack of 
a published memoir. This requires historians of the Cuban Missile Crisis to draw from the 
interviews, declassified documents, and memoirs from other men close to McCone to discover 
his role in the crisis. Most historians choose to utilize the large array of sources to discover the 
reasons why the crisis happened and how select members of the government influenced the 
outcome. Most of the information on McCone‟s involvement in EXCOMM comes from other 
participants such as George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Robert Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and 
Theodore “Ted” Sorensen. Ball‟s memoir examined McCone‟s management of the intelligence 
effort before and during the crisis, and showed McCone‟s repeated requests for more flights even 
during his honeymoon.
15
 Bundy takes a more critical view on McCone, showing how McCone 
used his position to convince the administration, without evidence, that the Soviets were placing 
nuclear weapons in Cuba.
16
 Robert Kennedy‟s work is one of the best tales on the crisis, but 
contained little information on McCone except for a few quotations.
17
 Schlesinger and Sorenson 
emphasized how McCone challenged the viewpoint of Kennedy and the intelligence community, 
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and how he pushed the administration to re-evaluate their mindset.
18
 The best documentation on 
McCone‟s involvement came from the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Kennedy 
Tapes, Mary McAuliffe‟s CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis and Dino Brugioni‟s 
Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Out of the many primary 
sources on the Cuban Missile Crisis, McAuliffe‟s CIA Documents provided the best evidence on 
McCone‟s importance during the crisis through the declassified CIA memorandums produced by 
McCone and his deputies.
19
 Brugioni‟s insight as a peripheral member in the crisis provided key 
insights into McCone‟s management style and his role outside the EXCOMM meetings.20 The 
Foreign Relations of the United States draws heavily from McAuliffe‟s work on the meetings, as 
well as providing information from the messages between other members of EXCOMM. 
 Most of the information on McCone‟s involvement came from excerpts from larger 
works on issues facing the U.S. during the crisis. The most detailed work that studied McCone‟s 
involvement in depth was Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali‟s One Hell of a Gamble, 
where McCone received a small section on his “crusade” during the summer and fall of 1962.21 
Another excellent source on McCone‟s involvement with the intelligence mission comes from 
James Nathan‟s Anatomy of a Missile Crisis. In this work, Nathan produced an excellent 
background on McCone, from his beginnings as a successful executive, his time as Chairman of 
the Atomic Energy Commission, and his service as head of the CIA.
22
 Other writers such as 
Graham Allison, Bruce J. Allyn, Michael Beschloss, Don Bohning, James Blight, Lawrence 
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Freedman, Phillip Nash, Robert Weisbrot, David Welch, and Philip Zelikow together help build 
a more complete picture of McCone‟s efforts during the crisis.  
Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow focused on the reasons the Soviets placed missiles in 
Cuba, and noted that McCone was one of the first officials to recognize the Soviet reasons.
23
 
Beschloss detailed how McCone‟s background influenced his views about the Soviet Union, and 
his belief that the Soviets might place nuclear weapons in Cuba.
24
 Philip Nash‟s The Other 
Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the JUPITERS gave an excellent analysis on 
McCone‟s arguments supporting the decision to remove the JUPITER missiles from Turkey in 
their negotiations with the Soviet Union.
25
 A complement to Nash‟s work is Bohning‟s detailed 
analysis of the covert operations authorized against Castro during the summer of 1962. Bohning 
provided information on how the intelligence resources used for the earlier operations helped 
McCone discover the true nature of the Soviet buildup in Cuba.
26
 Allyn, Blight, and Welch‟s 
Cuba on the Brink contained a brief section on McCone‟s clash with members of Kennedy‟s 
administration on the missile issue, and credited McCone as the principal figure in the discovery 
of the missiles.
27
 Freedman‟s Kennedy’s Wars is one of the best recent sources on the crisis that 
contained many important facts about McCone, from his involvement in covert operations 
against Castro, his search for the missiles, and his efforts as part of EXCOMM.
28
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 While the recent surge in crisis studies produced several detailed works on the event, 
little work exists on connecting John McCone‟s influence throughout the period before and after 
the crisis. Most historians viewed McCone as the primary reason that the United States found the 
missiles, but used information on his role as part of a larger study on the crisis itself. McCone 
was a key member of the intelligence effort to find the missiles, and served as one of the core 
members of EXCOMM when the president needed solutions to the discovery of the missiles in 
Cuba. When Khrushchev made the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba, McCone took on 
the responsibility of overseeing the intelligence sources he created during the crisis to determine 
if indeed the Soviets were removing the missiles from Cuba. Therefore, McCone‟s involvement 
in the Cuban Missile Crisis is one of the key facets to understanding how the crisis began and the 
role the U.S. government had in ending the conflict. 
  
9 
 
CHAPTER ONE: John McCone and the Intelligence Mission  
 John McCone was the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from November 1961 
to April 1965. During the summer and fall of 1962, he maintained that the Soviet Union might 
place nuclear weapons into Cuba. Part of the reason for this hypothesis was his belief that the 
placement of missiles into Cuba would give Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev a way to counter 
the growing American nuclear superiority and protect the communist government on Cuba.
29
 
McCone made his concerns clear to President John Kennedy and other members of the 
administration before leaving on his honeymoon in late August 1962. During his honeymoon, he 
used his deputy, General Marshall S. Carter, to continue his efforts in Washington. When he 
returned from his honeymoon a few weeks later, he still found gaps in the reconnaissance over 
western portions of Cuba and pushed again for more reconnaissance flights.
30
 After the president 
finally authorized more flights, the October 14 flight found the missiles. McCone‟s “crusade”31 
was a primary reason for the early discovery of these missiles. 
McCone was born in January 1902 to a wealthy family in San Francisco. His father, 
Alexander McCone, ran the family‟s iron foundries throughout California. In 1922, McCone 
graduated from the University of California at Berkeley with a degree in engineering, and began 
working in the steel industry. McCone rose through the ranks of several steel factories, became 
the Vice President of the Consolidated Steel Corporation, and helped establish the Bechtel-
McCone Corporation. As founder and as an engineer, McCone had a role in the design and 
construction of several oil refineries, factories, and power plants in the Americas and the Middle 
East. Even during the Great Depression, McCone managed his businesses making large sums of 
money through construction projects. During World War II, he founded the Seattle-Tacoma 
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Corporation, and invested $100,000 into the California Shipbuilding Corporation, making a $44 
million dollar profit by the end of the war. After the war, McCone served in the Truman 
administration as a Deputy to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, and as the Under Secretary 
of the Air Force. During his time within the Truman administration, McCone played an 
important role in the incorporation of nuclear weapons into air warfare tactics.
32
  
Along with his business savvy and government experience, McCone had the look of a 
Republican tycoon, with his “rimless eyeglasses, white hair, roseate complexion, and three-piece 
suits.”33 In 1958, McCone‟s business experience, government experience, Republican ideals, and 
his staunch belief in the importance of nuclear technologies led President Dwight Eisenhower to 
appoint him as the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).
34
 Yet even in the 
Republican administration, McCone found himself as an outsider due to his outspoken comments 
on the importance of nuclear weapons.
35
 McCone‟s comments made him many enemies within 
the Eisenhower administration, especially on the issue of the nuclear test ban, which he 
opposed.
36
 McCone believed that Soviet propaganda encouraged many Americans to support the 
test ban treaty, and fought against President Eisenhower‟s support for the ban as well.37 The 
main reason McCone maintained his position as Chairmen of the AEC was the fear of the 
political consequences if Eisenhower removed a Republican he had placed in the position.
38
 
While McCone served in the AEC, a revolution broke out in Cuba. The dictatorship of 
Fuglencio Batista led many Cubans to resent their government and his American supporters.
39
 
                                                 
32
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30, 1962, The New York Times, 20. 
33
 Nathan, Anatomy of a Missile Crisis, 146. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 417. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Edward H. Judge, A Hard and Bitter Peace (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall Press, 1996), 160.  
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Fidel Castro became the leader of the dissenters, and pushed for the overthrow of the oppressive 
Batista government. Castro and his movement toppled the Batista government faster than experts 
in both the United States and the Soviet Union had predicted.
40
 As Castro consolidated his 
power, he declared Cuba a socialist state, modeled after the teachings of Karl Marx and Vladimir 
Lenin. This dramatic event provided the Soviet Union with a tremendous opportunity, while for 
the United States this event proved its worst fears. With a Soviet-backed communist nation in 
Latin America, the Soviet Union could pressure many Latin American countries into accepting 
communism, undermining the U.S.‟ close neighbors. With the close proximity of Cuba to the 
United States, roughly ninety miles, the Soviet Union could threaten the security of the U.S. by 
placing weapons in Cuba.
41
 
In response to recommendations from the intelligence community, the newly elected 
President John F. Kennedy approved a plan for an invasion of Cuba to remove Castro from 
office.
42
 On April 12, 1961, the invasion commenced, with surprise air strikes against Cuba air 
force buildings and installations with Cuban forces landing on the beaches. However, the attacks 
eliminated only half of the Cuban air force, and Kennedy denied several requests for air 
support.
43
 As a result, the invasion failed, with 114 dead and 1,189 captured. This failure 
severely shifted international opinion away from the United States, and led to an overhaul of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Kennedy showed his displeasure, when he exclaimed that the 
“CIA should not undertake operations where weapons larger than hand guns are used.”44 He 
                                                 
40
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replaced Allen Dulles with McCone as Director of CIA (DCI) despite McCone‟s Republican 
credentials.
45
  
There were several reasons Kennedy placed the Republican executive at the head of the 
CIA.
46
 Both McCone and Robert Kennedy‟s families attended the same Catholic Church, and 
they became close during the sickness and death of McCone‟s first wife, Rosemary Cooper.47 
Arthur Schlesinger, an aide to Kennedy, believed this friendship had a large role in the selection 
of McCone, but McCone‟s reputation as a “rigid cold warrior” was also important.48 While 
McCone was not Kennedy‟s first choice as DCI, he was impressed with McCone “for his 
reputation as a man of action,”49 and believed that his appointment “would deflect opposition to 
his [Kennedy‟s] intention to reduce the CIA‟s size and autonomy after Bay of Pigs.”50 Kennedy 
also appreciated McCone‟s knowledge of Soviet missile strength, and without deliberation with 
his cabinet, the president appointed him as Director of the CIA in November 1961.
51
 
Once he arrived at the CIA headquarters, McCone made sweeping changes to the 
organization, beginning with the elimination of the intercom system that allowed senior officers 
to interrupt the Director in his office.
52
 McCone replaced many of Dulles‟ deputies and most of 
the division chiefs, and battled with the Pentagon on the use of intelligence planes, satellites, and 
better logistical support.
53
 Because of his prior relationship with the AEC, McCone set up a CIA 
                                                 
45
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briefing for the commission to keep it informed on Soviet nuclear capabilities.
54
 McCone also 
had the advantage of being new to the intelligence community, giving him a more objective 
viewpoint on intelligence estimates.
55
 McCone entered the office as the Agency released reports 
on the Bay of Pigs operation. One report, from Lyman Kirkpatrick, detailed the reasons for the 
failure of the operation.
56
 Kirkpatrick made the mistake of handing the report directly to McCone 
instead of using the proper channels, a breach that angered McCone as much as the report itself 
did.
57
 This incident led “the hawkish republican” to impose stricter guidelines on intelligence 
reports, and later blamed Kennedy and Dulles for failing to make the invasion work.
58
 McCone 
earned the reputation of a “hard-driving executive” as DCI, but many believed him to be a much 
more cautious and realistic manager than previous directors.
59
 McCone had the important role of 
repairing the reputation and morale of the CIA, by utilizing new measures to protect secrecy and 
provide quality national intelligence.
60
 
While McCone reformed the CIA, tensions mounted between the Soviet Union and the 
United States. After the Bay of Pigs, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet 
government voiced support for the Castro regime and issued several warnings to Washington.
61
 
Castro, fearful of future invasions, began requesting larger arms shipments from the Soviet 
Union.
62
 Khrushchev agreed to send larger supplies of small arms, at the same time increasing 
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the economic assistance to the fledging communist nation.
63
 In Khrushchev‟s mind, the situation 
in Cuba and the success of the regime coincided with the overall prestige of the Soviet Union in 
the international independence movement of the early 1960s.
64
 The Soviet assistance at the time 
involved personal weapons and vehicles, as Khrushchev delayed his decision to introduce 
weapons systems that were more expensive.
65
   
 In April 1962, after making the decision to send military aid to Cuba, Khrushchev 
continued receiving reports of increased American subversion efforts in Cuba.
66
 With the Soviet 
Union falling farther behind in the construction of nuclear missiles, and the threat to the 
communist government in Cuba, Khrushchev felt he had two choices: to focus the overstretched 
Soviet economy on either a costly nuclear buildup or on much-needed domestic improvements.
67
 
The Soviet premier analyzed the situation and realized Cuba‟s importance to the communist 
movement and the advantages to placing nuclear weapons on the island to secure Castro and 
balance the strategic situation with the Americans.
68
 It was then that Khrushchev decided to 
supply Cuba with long-range weapons to accomplish his goals. Khrushchev saw that the best 
option to solve these dilemmas was to introduce medium and intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles (MRBM, IRBM), weapons that the Soviet Union had in surplus. This decision solved 
the two issues without overstretching the Soviet economy.
69
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 The Soviet Union began making official plans to send offensive weapons to Cuba during 
May.
70
 The first step in formulating the plan was to sell the idea to Fidel Castro. While many in 
the Soviet government believed that Castro would not accept a large Soviet base in Cuba, the 
negotiations concluded with the decision to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba. Khrushchev 
assigned Rodion Malinovsky, his Defense Minister, to create an operation to hide the 
deployment from Western intelligence.
71
 On May 24, the Soviet government initiated Operation 
ANADYR to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba, and prepared the selected units for deployment. 
Khrushchev believed that the presence of nuclear missiles in Cuba would counterbalance the 
American superiority in long-range ballistic missiles and guaranteed the safety of Cuba.
72
 
Operation ANADYR went into effect in June 1962, and preparations for the shipment of 
materials to Cuba began.
73
 With the amount of materials and personnel assigned to ANADYR, 
the operation marked the clear divergence from past Soviet assistance to non-bloc countries.
74
 
According to Anatoly Gribkov, one of the staff assigned to planning ANADYR, the sheer size of 
the operation meant American intelligence would eventually discover the missiles.
75
 The plan 
called for large shipments that contained several missile divisions of the Soviet Rocket Forces, 
anti-aircraft weapons, jet fighters and bombers, and radar equipment.
76
 To confuse Western 
intelligence, Malinovsky and his staff chose the name ANADYR for the operation, in relation to 
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the Anadyr River that flows through eastern Siberia.
77
 Soviet personnel received orders to pack 
for frigid weather, stating their destination for somewhere in the upper regions of Siberia. En 
route into the Atlantic, Soviet captains, under the supervision of Committee for State Security 
(KGB) officers, opened their destination orders, learning that Cuba was their destination.
78
 
Soviet personnel offloaded the materials at night in Cuba only, and concealed their transport to 
the construction sites.
79
 These methods limited the possibilities of premature discovery of the 
contents of the shipments.
80
  
During the same period the Soviet Union enacted ANADYR, the United States had a 
secret operation underway in Cuba, codenamed MONGOOSE. The Kennedy administration 
enacted MONGOOSE to remove Castro‟s government from power. A select group of 
Washington officials met together to discuss subversion and reconnaissance plans. Officials such 
as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Deputy Undersecretary Alexis Johnson, General 
Maxwell Taylor, and General Lyman Lemnitzer served in the Special Group. Robert Kennedy 
also attended many of the MONGOOSE meetings, but had a more limited role. While 
MONGOOSE focused on efforts to collapse the Castro regime, it had the unexpected role of 
revealing the beginnings of the Soviet buildup in Cuba, which led to increased reconnaissance of 
the island.
81
   
MONGOOSE used several methods for gathering intelligence in Cuba. The first method 
involved surveillance of shipments destined for Cuba, and the types of weapons or materials they 
contained. The second came from first-hand accounts from refugees fleeing Cuba for the United 
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States. The use of intelligence agents on the ground in Cuba provided the most accurate 
information on the ground. Photoreconnaissance, the final method, provided the concrete proof 
needed for Washington to act on the intelligence reports from Cuba.
82
 The surveillance of 
shipping bound for Cuba carried with it inherent limitations and problems. While satellite and 
reconnaissance planes provided detailed photographs of the ships bound for Cuba, much of the 
contents remained in the holds within the ship. For those crates on the decks, the CIA used a 
specialized system known as “crate-ology”.83 This system utilized a computer and calculated 
measurements of items in reconnaissance pictures, formulating their size for analysts to compare 
to their data on Soviet technology. This system had its restrictions, hindering its use as evidence. 
The system did correctly identify the crates transporting bomber and fighter parts on the decks of 
the Soviet ships, but neither the crate-ology system nor the standard shipping intelligence 
methods found the MRBMs within the holds of the ship.
84
 
Since the overthrow of the Batista government in 1959, thousands of Cuban refugees fled 
to the United States and brought reports with them. These refugees brought stories of dramatic 
events in Cuba, notably reports of missiles in Cuba. These reports contained a numerous false or 
incorrect accounts. This caused the “cry wolf phenomenon”85 to develop inside the intelligence 
community. The sheer volume of the reports also made this form of intelligence insufficient on 
its own.
86
 In terms of providing evidence for Soviet actions in Cuba, the system could do little 
more than describe the situation for the people of Cuba and for the mentality of the common 
people on American efforts in Cuba.
87
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Photo-reconnaissance provided the verification that policy makers in Washington needed 
to take action in Cuba. The most useful photo-reconnaissance came from the Lockheed U-2 
high-altitude reconnaissance plane. The U-2 proved incredibly useful over the skies of Cuba in 
1962. The main problem to this method of reconnaissance is its dependence on good to fair 
weather to bring back accurate pictures. Within hurricane season in the Caribbean, there were a 
limited number of days each month for complete coverage of Cuba. The Soviet Union also 
devised a defensive missile system to engage high altitude aircraft, increasing the risk over areas 
where the system existed. Up to September 1962, Cuba lacked this missile system, but after their 
installation, the Kennedy administration decided to limit the flights over the island.
88
  
MONGOOSE became the primary focus for McCone and the CIA in the summer of 
1962. On August 1 during the Special Group meeting, McCone presented the intelligence 
community‟s analysis of the strength of Castro‟s regime and the potential for organized 
resistance against his government. The report concluded that Castro had consolidated his control 
over the communist party in Cuba, a fact recognized by the Soviet government. Despite their 
differences, the intelligence community believed that the Soviet and Cuban relations improved 
from March to August, with the Soviet Union sending military equipment and advisors to aid the 
Cuban military. The report stipulated that while the Soviets increased their military shipments to 
Cuba, they provided only defensive weapons. According to the available data, the Soviets had 
not made a formal commitment to protect Cuba and had not decided to station Soviet troops on 
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the island. This conclusion led the community to believe that the Soviets would not enhance their 
commitment to Cuba in the near future.
89
 
McCone‟s experiences in the Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission along with 
his anti-communist ideals influenced his unique analysis of the early reports of Soviet military 
equipment in Cuba.
90
 The experiences in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations made him 
skeptical of Kennedy‟s “Flexible Response,” because he believed that the nuclear balance 
remained the crucial deterrence to Soviet aggressions. To McCone, the minimum number of 
nuclear missiles and warheads did not count as deterrence and assumed Khrushchev felt the same 
way. Because of this mindset, McCone was more receptive to the idea of the Soviet Union using 
Cuba as a missile base, despite the prevailing mindset within the administration and the rest of 
the intelligence community that the Soviets would not take such a risk.
91
 
While the intelligence community had little knowledge of Soviet plans for Cuba, the 
early reports of increased shipments from the Soviet Union to Cuba alarmed McCone. On July 
26, the first ANADYR shipment aboard the Maria Ulyanova arrived at the port of Cabanas.
92
 
Reports of the first shipments arriving in Cuba did not reach Washington until the first week of 
August. McCone viewed the increase in Soviet personnel and the sudden increase in shipments 
as the first steps in a new Soviet commitment to Cuba.
93
 On August 10, McCone voiced his 
concerns about Cuba during a meeting with the Special Group. McCone reported on the sudden 
increase of unidentified military equipment and Soviet personnel, and possibly electronic 
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equipment to compromise rocket tests at Cape Canaveral.
94
 During the meeting, McCone 
“expected that the Soviet Union would supplement economic, technical, and conventional 
military aid with medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM).”95 He justified his beliefs by 
comparing the Soviets placing missiles in Cuba with the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.
96
  
McCone‟s fears of the future deployment of missiles in Cuba continued to grow as more 
reports arrived in Washington. On August 20, he presented the Special Group with the analysis 
of the intelligence gathered since the August 10 meeting, based on sixty intelligence reports 
arriving from Cuba and reconnaissance flights over Soviet vessels and Cuban ports. According to 
intelligence reports, twenty-one Soviet ships docked in Cuban ports during the month of July, 
with seventeen ships en route in the Atlantic at the time of the report. Soviet personnel offloaded 
unknown materials from the docked vessels in large crates under extreme security precautions. 
McCone believed that these crates possibly contained airplane fuselages or missile components, 
and some contained components for radar equipment. Along with increased supplies, 
approximately 4,000 to 6,000 Soviet personnel arrived in Cuba in July and August, but no 
evidence of organized units. The implications of this operation, according to McCone, were that 
the crates possibly contained components for surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, 
Communications Intelligence (COMINT) equipment, or Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) 
systems. These systems posed a problem for future reconnaissance flights and operations in the 
Caribbean.
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The Special Group decided to brief other members of the administration on the Cuban 
situation in light of the most recent intelligence. On August 21, Rusk held a meeting in his office 
with McCone, McNamara, Johnson, Taylor, Lemnitzer, and Bundy. McCone stated its purpose 
was to bring other members of the cabinet up to date on the recent intelligence on Cuba. The 
DCI detailed that at the August 10 meeting, he gave as much information as available, and that 
since there was a substantial increase in Soviet assistance to Cuba. The extent of the Soviet 
operation was much more involved than previously believed, with preliminary indications of 
sophisticated electronic equipment and missile sites. McCone reiterated his concerns that the 
Soviets might place MRBMs into Cuba, and proposed that the administration have plans in place 
if it occurred. The group understood the critical nature of the situation and discussed various 
options in case the Soviet Union decided to risk placing nuclear missiles in Cuba. The group 
proposed a partial and total blockade, but feared that it might lead to similar actions by the Soviet 
Union in Berlin, Italy, and Turkey. McCone proposed aggressive actions in intelligence, 
sabotage, and guerilla warfare, and detailed the disappointing results in Cuba up to that point. 
The committee at the end of the meeting agreed that the situation was critical enough to brief the 
president, and McCone arranged a meeting with the president for Wednesday, August 22.
98
 
The following day, McCone brought the military buildup in Cuba to President Kennedy‟s 
attention.  McCone reported, “Intelligence of recent Soviet military assistance to Cuba indicates 
that an unusually large number of Soviet ships have delivered military cargos to Cuba since late 
July.”99 Construction projects underway in Cuba used materials and personnel offloaded from 
four Soviet ships, with at least 1,500 passengers. An additional 1,500 personnel arrived from late 
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July to the end of August, bringing the total number of Soviet personnel in Cuba to 5,000. 
McCone believed the Soviets had begun an unprecedented military aid program to Cuba, a 
program new and different from previous efforts.
100
   
Despite the large number of Soviet personnel, the report stipulated there was no direct 
evidence of organized army units in Cuba. Intelligence sources reported two large military 
construction sites on the northern coast of Cuba, with regular convoys from the ports to those 
construction areas. The construction appeared confined to northwest Cuba, and photo-
reconnaissance showed limited activity in other regions of the island. McCone concluded that 
while they had little knowledge of the nature of the construction, it could be the initial phases of 
a SAM defense system, intelligence-gathering facilities, or possibly missile sites. The general 
conclusion that the community and McCone agreed on was that the construction proved that the 
Soviet Union had taken a strong step forward in protecting Cuba. Despite McCone‟s suspicions 
on the introduction of missiles into Cuba, the president, Rusk, and McNamara doubted that the 
Soviets would risk moving nuclear missiles into Cuba.
101
 
While Kennedy did not believe the Soviets would risk placing missiles into Cuba, he 
joined the Special Group meeting on Thursday, August 23 with McCone, Rusk, McNamara, 
Gilpatric, Taylor, and Bundy. When the group discussed possible responses for Soviet actions in 
Cuba, McCone again raised the issue of what the administration should do in case the Soviets 
placed offensive missiles in Cuba. Kennedy requested more intelligence of Soviet personnel 
presently in Cuba, and the number and type of weapons delivered to the island. Kennedy 
anxiously wondered whether photo interpreters could decipher between SAM sites and surface-
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to-surface missile (SSM) sites.
102
 McCone told the president, “We probably could not 
differentiate between surface-to-air and 350 mile ground-to-ground offensive missiles.”103 
Kennedy wanted more analysis on the danger missile installations posed to the United States and 
Latin America, and whether the administration should release a statement detailing the American 
position on missiles in Cuba.
104
 During the discussion, McCone questioned the value of the 
JUPITER missiles in Italy and Turkey, and inquired how difficult they were to remove. 
McNamara spoke up stating that the JUPITERs “were useless, but difficult politically to 
remove.”105 The president wanted to know how to move against Soviet missiles in Cuba, using 
air strikes or an increased subversion effort.
106
  
In response to McCone‟s recommendations, Kennedy ordered a series of studies and 
reactions on the Soviet buildup in Cuba. National Security Action Memorandum 181 queried the 
Department of Defense about the possibility of removing the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. It called 
for a study on the implications of giving the intelligence to members of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and asked them to limit their assistance to Cuba. It also called for an 
analysis of possible actions if they discovered Soviet surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba. Bundy 
reiterated to the agencies that the president wanted an immediate response.
107
 
On August 25, McCone made his final recommendations before leaving on his 
honeymoon. McCone urged his deputy, General Carter,
108
 to recommend that the administration 
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support more reconnaissance flights to determine the extent of the construction projects 
underway in Cuba.
109
 After giving his last orders to Carter, McCone left Washington on August 
26, bound for Seattle, Washington, where he married Theiline Pigott
110
 on August 29.
111
 On 
August 30, the couple departed for Cape Ferrat on the French Riviera where they remained for 
most of the month of September.
112
 With McCone out of the country, Carter replaced McCone in 
meetings with the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and the MONGOOSE Special 
Group.
113
 On August 29, Carter met with the USIB, where he detailed his conversation with 
McCone and Lemnitzer on using Air Force RF-101
114
 and Navy RF-8
115
 reconnaissance aircraft 
to supplement the U-2 in Cuba.
116
 The following day, Carter attended the Special Group 
meeting, where he argued that other types of photography failed to provide enough detail on 
certain construction sites. Based partly on Carter‟s arguments, the Special Group agreed to study 
the issue further and locate specific targets that had the greatest need of low-level flights.
117
 
Carter sent several telegrams to McCone keeping the Director informed of the recent 
intelligence on Cuba and on the outcome of the meetings with the administration.
118
 With 
McCone‟s support, Carter kept ranking members of the administration from dismissing the idea 
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that the Soviets might place nuclear weapons into Cuba. Rather than suppress McCone‟s 
repeated statements that he believed the Soviets would place missiles in Cuba, Carter reiterated 
his ideas to important officials in Washington. Carter‟s importance to McCone‟s efforts became 
clear as the agency received more and more reports on construction projects in Cuba.
119
  
The first definitive report of the presence of SAM sites in Cuba came from a U-2 
reconnaissance flight on August 29. The U-2 flight that day covered areas around Havana and 
other parts of Western Cuba, and showed several construction sites consistent with previous 
SAM sites in the Soviet Union. Preliminary analysis identified the SAMs as the SA-2 
Guideline
120
, the same missile system responsible for downing Gary Power‟s U-2 in 1960. On 
August 31, Carter reported the readout of the U-2 flight to Bundy and Lemnitzer. After Bundy 
informed Kennedy of the conversation, Kennedy contacted Carter that afternoon. Kennedy put a 
freeze on distribution of the report, giving the intelligence community time to prepare an 
extensive briefing for him.
121
  
On September 1, Carter spoke with Ray Cline, the Acting Deputy Director of Intelligence 
(DD/I), authorizing him to prepare a full analysis of the photography. Cline presented his 
analysis to Carter on September 3, which showed not only the presence of SAM sites, but also 
guided missile boats, and additional land armaments. The photography discovered eight SAM 
sites under construction, and another unknown site being prepared. Due to the speed of the 
construction from overflights earlier in the month, analysts believed the sites could be 
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operational within two weeks. The U-2 also discovered eight Soviet missile boats, each armed 
with anti-ship missiles. The following day, Carter informed McCone in a telegram of the 
construction as well as his belief that the report altered the Cuban situation. Carter assured 
McCone that he would continue to push the administration for more reconnaissance flights 
during the scheduled briefing with the president later that day.
122
 
Following the briefing at the White House on September 4, Kennedy released a statement 
on the presence of SAMs and guided missile boats in Cuba. The statement included much of the 
information from Cline‟s report, and the conclusion that reconnaissance showed no offensive 
missiles. The statement did include a warning to the Soviets, where Kennedy stated that “where 
it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise.”123 After the release of the President‟s 
statement, the Special Group met to plan the next series of overflights. The summer weather over 
the Caribbean had limited the amount of useful photography on a majority of the August flights, 
leaving the Group to choose where to concentrate future reconnaissance flights. Carter approved 
the recommendations from McCone and the Special Group to direct the next flight to cover 
“those areas of the island which were not photographed because weather or range did not 
permit.”124 
After Carter authorized the Deputy Director of Research (DD/R) Herbert Scoville
125
 to 
create a plan for overflights of Cuba, he sent another telegram to McCone on September 5, where 
he detailed the Soviet and Cuban response to the president‟s ultimatum. At the time of the 
telegram, the Soviet Union had remained silent on the president‟s speech. The Cuban 
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government released its own statement emphasizing their right to self-defense against American-
sponsored attacks. Sources in Cuba believed that Castro might use the situation to justify 
increased Soviet military assistance, to divert intelligence sources from his economic and 
political problems. The next day, McCone received another cable from Carter which confirmed 
that Cuba had requested more Soviet assistance, but that the Soviet government “does…not 
desire [to] develop Cuba as Soviet base [in] this hemisphere.”126 While the Soviet government 
insisted on this sentiment to Rusk, Carter was reporting to McCone the confirmation of nine 
SAM sites.
127
 
McCone viewed the Soviet response with caution, because of his conviction that 
Khrushchev saw the situation as a means of balancing its strategic situation with the United 
States. The intelligence analysis from the August 29 mission led the intelligence community to 
believe that another missile site near Banes, Cuba might be a SSM site. The president once again 
chose to limit the dissemination of the report outside of the intelligence branches. When McCone 
received the report of this site, it fueled his suspicions concerning the Soviet intentions in Cuba. 
McCone reiterated his suspicions to Carter on September 7. After he thanked Carter for keeping 
him informed, McCone told Carter, “My hunch is we might face [sic] prospect of Soviet short-
range surface-to-surface missiles or portable type in Cuba which could possibly command 
important targets of Southeast United States and possibly Latin American Caribbean areas.” 
McCone prepared to meet with the French General Paul Jacquier in Paris, while he continued 
advocating low-level flights. The final point he suggested to Carter was that he speak to Rusk to 
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help develop policies for possible action in Cuba should the Soviets introduce missiles, even to 
the point of briefing other Latin American nations on current intelligence.
128
 
Reports of missiles in Cuba continued to surface in early September. Angel Gonzales, 
Chief of the Mexican branch of the Student Revolutionary Directorate, released a report to the 
New York Times showing the installation of guided missile sites in the Pinar Del Rio Province.
129
 
In Carter‟s response to McCone‟s telegram, he quoted a report that the son of a Cuban official 
had “‟Rockets of some kind that shot down U-2‟…and preparations being made for „complete 
destruction‟ of Guantanamo Base in event of attack on Cuba.”130 The situation in Cuba had 
reached the attention of the Republicans in Congress as well. According to Carter, Congressional 
Republicans gave the president the authority to invade Cuba if necessary. Carter planned to take 
McCone‟s statements on using RF-101 for reconnaissance and the introduction of missiles to 
Cuba again during the scheduled meeting with Bundy on Saturday, September 8.
131
 
Despite McCone‟s continuing correspondence to Washington, a series of problems with 
the U-2 complicated the intelligence-gathering mission. The U-2 flight on September 5 failed to 
produce any usable photography over the Banes site because of cloud cover.
132
 On August 30 
and September 8, a series of U-2 incidents led the Kennedy administration to re-evaluate the 
risks involved in using the aircraft over Cuba.
 
On September 4, the day of Kennedy‟s ultimatum, 
one of the U-2s accidentally penetrated Soviet airspace in the Soviet Far East, prompting the 
Soviets to send fighters to intercept.
133
 When Kennedy learned of the incursion, he immediately 
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prompted a halt to the missions over Soviet territory.
134
 On September 8, a U-2 was lost over the 
Chinese mainland, prompting even more restrictions on U-2 flights over Cuba.
135
 After this 
incident, Kennedy halted the entire program pending a briefing to review procedures.
136
   
Carter informed McCone of the decision to halt reconnaissance flights over Cuba. In 
Carter‟s September 8 telegram, he provided McCone another intelligence report on the 
September 5 U-2 flight. The new photographs showed three more SAM sites, located in the Las 
Villa Province in Central Cuba. In addition to the sites found on August 29, the total number rose 
to thirteen with the current report. Carter believed that 25 sites provided Cuba with a complete 
missile defense against approaching aircraft. Reconnaissance also showed one advanced Soviet 
MiG-21 fighter
137
, and possibly the parts to assemble nineteen more. Rusk asked Carter to 
convey his thanks for suggesting the creation of contingency plans with Latin American allies, 
and promised to take it under advisement. At the end of the telegram, Carter informed McCone 
of the decision to halt further U-2 flights pending an investigation.
138
 
On September 10, Carter sent another message to McCone, updating him on the search 
for the missing U-2. Despite a detailed search, intelligence had yet to find any sign of the U-2 
and had no information on the fate of the pilot. There was no evidence of any mechanical 
malfunction, leaving either pilot error or attack as the primary possibilities. Carter pointed out 
the interesting fact that the Soviet Union failed to take advantage of the incident as in previous 
incidents, but the community had no other information on the Soviet reaction. Carter assured 
McCone that the Board of National Estimates (BNE) received his previous comments on Cuba, 
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and promised to add his ideas to their analysis. In response to McCone‟s suggestion on using 
PROJECT KELLY
139
 over Cuba, Carter argued that the program might be usable in April of the 
following year.
140
 
McCone was apprehensive of the president‟s decision to halt U-2 flights over Cuba. 
While he believed that the U-2 incident was distressing, in his mind, the U-2 remained the best 
intelligence-gathering method available to the intelligence community. In his September 10 
response to Carter, McCone believed that the danger of an incident always existed with the U-2, 
stating, “I pointed out to Special Group Pacif [sic] and higher authority that an incident was 
inevitable.” Once again, McCone took the opportunity to make his views on missiles in Cuba 
known to Carter.  It was in this telegram that McCone gave his reasoning for the placement of 
missiles in Cuba. McCone wrote, “[it is] Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses 
being established in Cuba as such extremely costly measures to accomplish security and secrecy 
not consistent with other policies…It appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are 
for the purpose of insuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMs to be installed 
by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from overflights.” McCone 
concluded his message with a remark on how the beautiful weather helped make that 
determination and urged Carter to have the BNE study the possibility in detail.
141
  
Later that afternoon, Kirkpatrick attended the White House meeting on Cuban overflights 
and sent notes from the meeting in the daily cable to McCone. According to Kirkpatrick, Bundy 
called the meeting to share with the CIA the administration‟s concern over the Cuban overflight 
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program. Bundy informed the group that Rusk questioned Carter, stating, “How do you expect 
me to negotiate on Berlin with all these incidents.” Rusk then analyzed the proposal for two 
more overflights to over the areas that the August 29 and September 5 flights missed. The risk of 
a third incident convinced Rusk to allow for peripheral flights around the island and over 
international waters. Rusk authorized four flights, two peripheral and two over international 
waters, to limit the risk to the safety of the pilots. At the end of the meeting, Kirkpatrick noted 
that Bundy and Rusk agreed that the overflights would continue if no further incidents 
occurred.
142
 
While the Special Group considered the future of U-2 flights over Cuba, Carter sent 
McCone‟s recommendations to the DD/I and requested that the BNE create the necessary 
analysis. Carter sent another memorandum to McNamara asking for further reconnaissance over 
the Banes site. The U-2 could not effectively photograph this site, meaning that other 
reconnaissance aircraft might be useful. On September 11, Washington also received the first 
official Soviet response to the President‟s September ultimatums and the U-2 incidents, which 
Carter sent to McCone along with the BNE‟s response. According to the Soviets, any American 
attack on Cuba would unleash a global war. The Soviet government believed the United States 
had plans to invade Cuba, and took steps to boost its defenses.
143
 On the subject of the presence 
of missiles in Cuba, the BNE viewed the placement of SAMs in Cuba as “reasonably explained 
by other than desire to hide later buildup.” The report argued that the Soviets might place 
missiles in Cuba, but that the risk involved was not equal to the dangers of American 
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intervention. The BNE promised to include their preliminary report in the Special National 
Intelligence Estimate.
144
 
While McCone and the Board of National Estimates argued over Soviet intentions, the 
intelligence community continued analyzing the photography. On September 13, intelligence 
reports provided more information on the suspicious missile site near Banes. It stated that the 
facility appeared to be a cruise missile battery, possibly the SS-N-1, the SS-N-2, or the SS-C-
1.
145
 The report showed the location of similar missile sites near Bay of Pigs and other beaches, 
which led to the analysis that their placement coincided with probable invasion locations from 
American troops.
146
  
When McCone learned of the SSM site at Banes, he immediately repeated his statement 
that the present construction projects were the prelude to the introduction of nuclear missiles in 
Cuba. Despite the Agency assessment that the Soviets sent only defensive weapons to Cuba, 
McCone once again wrote, “Also I continue to be concerned that the establishment of defensive 
equipment and installations is merely a prelude to the location of an offensive weapons 
capability.”147 Carter responded to McCone‟s telegram immediately, informing him that 
intelligence reports showed that Soviets had twenty-nine ships bound for Cuba. Refugee reports 
showed the movement of SAM equipment, and other sources showed the arrival of more torpedo 
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boats and anti-submarine ships. Carter made no comment on McCone‟s statement about the 
missiles, but Kirkpatrick confirmed that Carter took the comments to the BNE and kept the 
Special Group informed on McCone‟s fears.148 
McCone made repeated requests to the BNE to study the prospects for the Soviet Union 
placing missiles in Cuba. When McCone received word of the Soviet comments comparing their 
aid to Cuba with American aid to nations surrounding the Soviet Union, he again urged the 
Board to study the feasibility of the Soviets secretly sending offensive weapons to Cuba. He 
made the comment “we must carefully study the prospect of MRBM‟s in Cuba” to show how 
strongly he believed that the Soviets would introduce those weapons.
149
 McCone believed that 
the Soviets would use Cuba similar to how the United States used Britain, Italy, and Turkey. He 
argued that the CIA and rest of the intelligence community had the responsibility to keep the 
government informed of the dangers if the Soviets chose to take the risk. From the press report 
McCone received, the director believed that the estimate needed to include a usable distinction 
between the terms “offensive” and “defensive” weapons. If nuclear weapons did exist in Cuba, 
McCone suggested a study on how long the Soviets needed to install the missiles and asked the 
board to consider regions of the island where the SAM defenses would hinder overflights. 
McCone concluded that the estimate should include all these elements and include alternative 
plans of action should they find missiles in Cuba.
150
 
The rift between the analysts and McCone became apparent with the release of the BNE‟s 
report on Cuba. While McCone‟s suspicions of Soviet intentions in Cuba continued to grow as 
he received more intelligence reports, a majority of the intelligence community believed that the 
Soviets did not intend to take such a risk in light of the expected American response. On 
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September 16, Carter sent a copy of McCone‟s cables to Cline. After Cline reviewed the cable, 
he stated, “An introduction of MRBMs was unlikely because of the risk of U.S. intervention.”151 
On September 19, the BNE released their assessment of the military buildup in Cuba with the 
Special National Security Estimate 85-3-62. This estimate stated that the purpose of the Soviet 
military buildup in Cuba was to strengthen Castro‟s regime by creating an advanced air defense 
and coastal defense network to thwart any invasion. The board believed there was a great 
temptation for the Soviet Union to introduce nuclear weapons into Cuba, and other offensive 
weapons such as IL-28 bombers, submarines, and short-range SSMs. The report stated, “The 
Soviet Union could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet 
medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba.”152 It stressed, however, that it would 
be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy.
153
  
When McCone received the Special Estimate from Carter on September 19, he viewed it 
with skepticism, but acknowledged that he had no hard evidence of missiles. McCone responded 
to the estimate on September 20, in which he made several recommendations to Carter. He 
believed that the Board should re-evaluate their conclusion on the risk of the Soviet Union 
placing nuclear missiles in Cuba. McCone believed that, “An offensive Soviet Cuban base will 
provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other 
critical areas and hence might take an unexpected risk in order to establish such a position.”154 At 
the end of his cable, McCone wanted to have the most recent Cuban intelligence documents with 
him to discuss with the Bundy during a scheduled meeting in Paris. Later that day, McCone 
received word from Kirkpatrick that Carter passed his requests to Cline, and the Intelligence 
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Director made no changes to the estimate, because the intelligence community endorsed and 
released it.
155
 
As McCone traveled back from Europe, the intelligence community received a series of 
reports on the presence of missiles on the island. On September 20, the CIA received a report 
dated September 9 that Claudio Morinas, Castro‟s personal pilot, made the statement “there will 
be many mobile ramps for intermediate-range rockets.”156 Another agent sent a report on 
September 12, which the CIA received on September 27. The agent reported a large convoy of 
vehicles headed for the San Cristobal area of Cuba, with trailers seventy feet in length, believed 
to be carrying large missiles.
157
 A similar report arrived in Washington on October 1, detailing 
another large convoy in the Pinar Del Rio with eight large trailers, carrying “huge tubes” larger 
than the flatbed.
158
 These detailed reports from reliable sources led some analysts in the CIA to 
study the possibility of the trailers transporting SS-4 “Sandal” missiles.159  
McCone viewed these reports as confirmation that the U.S. needed to increase 
surveillance of the island. During the Special Group meeting on October 4, McCone urged the 
administration to authorize a series of U-2 reconnaissance flights. Robert Kennedy began the 
meeting reiterating President Kennedy‟s concern with the lack of success in the subversion of 
Castro‟s regime. McCone told Robert Kennedy that one of reasons for the problems in 
MONGOOSE was the hesitation of the government to risk American assets. After a brief 
argument, the group agreed to re-consider the limitations placed on the U-2. McCone encouraged 
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the group to authorize flight plans to include complete coverage of the island along with the 
approved peripheral flights. Because of the limited number of flights and the peripheral 
coverage, McCone noticed a large gap over Western Cuba overlooked since September 5. The 
group agreed with McCone, and proposed that the members prepare a plan of action and submit 
their proposal during their next scheduled meeting. They decided that the new overflights were 
justified by stating the flights were, “in the interest of our own security and the security of the 
Western hemisphere.”160 
McCone understood the need for more U-2 flights, and made those concerns known to 
members of the administration. On October 5, McCone reiterated his concerns in a meeting with 
Bundy. After discussing the conclusions of the Special Group, McCone stated, “the decisions to 
restrict U-2 flights had placed the United States Intelligence Community in a position where it 
could not report with assurance the development of offensive capabilities in Cuba.”161 While 
Bundy did not believe the Soviets would take that risk, McCone argued “it [was] most probable 
that Soviet-Castro operations would end up with an established offensive capability in Cuba 
including MRBMs.”162 McCone believed that Bundy shared the views of most of the intelligence 
community, but he could not agree with their recommendations. He wanted the president to 
authorize complete coverage of the island with the U-2. The meeting ended with the agreement 
to review the situation in more detail over the weekend.
163
 
While the administration did not believe the Soviets would place missiles into Cuba, 
President Kennedy made a public statement that the U.S. would conduct overhead 
reconnaissance of the island. Kennedy also met with the Special Group when they made their 
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decision on October 9 to launch a series of U-2 flights covering the western portions of Cuba. 
The Group agreed on two purposes for the next flight: to test the readiness of the SAM defense 
system and cover the areas reported from the intelligence agents in Cuba in late September. From 
October 10 to October 13, the weather halted the U-2 flight, but on October 14, the U-2 covered 
areas around Havana, and was the first flight to discover the presence of nuclear missiles in 
Cuba, the missiles that McCone believed the Soviets might place in Cuba.
164
 
McCone came to the Central Intelligence Agency as a successful manager with strict 
anti-communist ideals and great insight into intelligence. When the intelligence community 
received the first reports of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba, McCone correctly argued that 
the present buildup was the first phase in the establishment of a nuclear missile base on the 
island. He justified this belief through his understanding of the strategic situation between the 
Soviet Union and the United States. He believed that while the risk was great to the operation, it 
also provided the Soviet Union a way to balance many of their objectives without risking reprisal 
from either Cuba or the United States. While McCone took a lengthy honeymoon during the 
crucial month before the crisis began, he pushed Deputy Director Carter to continue his efforts to 
keep the administration from being surprised if intelligence confirmed his beliefs. McCone 
continued to encourage Washington officials and the BNE to consider that the Soviets saw the 
great advantage to having nuclear missiles in Cuba, sending several cables to Carter and other 
CIA officials. While the BNE believed that the Soviets would not risk placing offensive weapons 
in Cuba, several reports from intelligence sources led several analysts to agree with McCone that 
they needed more reconnaissance flights. After arriving back from his honeymoon, McCone 
pushed the Special Group and the administration to authorize a new series of flights to cover the 
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island. When the U-2 covered the island on October 14, it found the MRBM missile sites under 
construction. The photographs from the U-2 confirmed McCone‟s fears and launched the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. Had it not been for McCone‟s continued efforts, the missiles would have been 
operational before their discovery by the United States. 
39 
 
CHAPTER TWO: John McCone and the EXCOMM 
 
After learning of the October 14 U-2 flights, McCone pushed the Kennedy administration 
to remove Castro and his communist government from power. Continuing his crusade against 
Castro, McCone joined several prominent members of the Executive Committee of the National 
Security Council (EXCOMM) in proposing a surgical strike against missile sites followed by an 
invasion.
165
 McCone had the job of briefing the administration on daily intelligence reports and 
construction efforts in Cuba.
166
 His greatest contribution to the intelligence effort was his 
coordination and integration of all the major civilian intelligence agencies during the Crisis to 
reduce the time required for analysis. He also had the job of briefing former President 
Eisenhower on the situation in Cuba, and pushed for briefings with the allies. Despite his 
emotional calls against negotiations with the Soviet Union, McCone‟s efforts to coordinate and 
integrate intelligence reports allowed the president to have a detailed picture on the status of the 
Soviet missiles, allowing Kennedy to make informed decisions when dealing with the 
Kremlin.
167
   
On October 14, a U-2 reconnaissance flight found several Soviet MRBMs construction 
sites in Western Cuba. The U-2, piloted by Air Force Major Richard Heyser, collected 928 
images during its brief flight over Cuba.
168
 When the film arrived at the National Photographic 
Intelligence Center (NPIC), analysts found three MRBM sites near San Cristobal, with eight 
MRBM transporters located adjacent to those sites.
169
 On October 15, intelligence analysts 
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reported that the missiles were either SS-3 “Shyster”170 or SS-4 “Sandal” ballistic missiles, with 
a maximum range of 1,100 nautical miles. The report stipulated that there was no evidence 
precisely when the missiles arrived in Cuba, but their judgment was that they arrived sometime 
in September.
171
 The decision to place missiles in Cuba showed the determination of the Soviets 
to deter any American intervention against Castro‟s regime, by increasing the risk and costs of 
such a conflict. The report concluded that the Soviet leadership must have known that it would 
complicate the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that the 
presence of missiles in Cuba threatened the large military bases and urban areas in the 
southeastern United States.
172
 The Strategic Air Command (SAC) had eighteen bomber and 
tanker bases within that range, and an Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silo. The Navy 
had three major bases and other smaller facilities from Panama to Puerto Rico that the missiles 
had the range to reach. The biggest target that the missiles could reach was Washington D.C.
173
 
When the U-2 discovered the missiles, McCone was on the West Coast preparing to bury 
his stepson.
174
 Because McCone needed to escort the body from California back to Seattle for 
burial, Carter replaced him in meetings with the National Security Council, while Cline replaced 
him at the Commonwealth-US Intelligence Methods Conference.
175
 When Cline returned from 
the conference, he met with a delegation of intelligence analysts who informed him of the 
presence of missiles in Cuba. Because McCone was on the West Coast and Carter was at an 
informal gathering in McLean, Virginia, Cline spent much of the evening studying the 
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intelligence reports before attending the gathering. When Carter received word from Cline about 
the intelligence report on Cuba, Carter authorized its dissemination to members of the United 
States Intelligence Board (USIB) and to McCone. McCone received news of the U-2 report from 
Walter Elder, his deputy in Washington, where he reported to the DCI, “That which you alone 
said would happen did.”176  
On Tuesday, October 16, President Kennedy called a meeting in the Oval Office.
177
 
Carter took McCone‟s place on the committee during the first meeting, where he briefed the 
President and members of the cabinet on the intelligence from the October 14 flight.
178
 
McNamara, Rusk, Ball, Gilpatric, Taylor, Vice President Johnson, Dillon, Robert Kennedy, 
Bundy, Sorensen, and Kenneth O‟Donnell, President Kennedy‟s Special Assistant, all attended 
the briefing. Rusk made the comment that McCone saw the possibility of missiles back in 
August, and related the conversation with McCone about the Soviets using Cuba like the United 
States used Turkey.
179
 Rusk proposed several courses of action for the group to consider. He first 
proposed a series of air strikes, followed by an invasion of the island.
180
 He also proposed a 
warning to Castro and steps to isolate Cuba from the rest of the Free World.
181
 McNamara 
argued that if they attacked Cuba, they must attack before the missiles became operational, while 
Taylor confirmed that a surprise attack was essential to that attack. Kennedy authorized several 
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U-2 flights to cover the island, and asked for a report linking the Cuban situation with other Latin 
American nations and European allies.
182
 
After the meeting, President Kennedy decided to create a special committee to devise a 
plan of action regarding the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.  The members of the committee 
would meet every day to determine the course of action, taking the name EXCOMM, an 
abbreviation of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.
 183
 When McCone 
arrived back in Washington, he immediately became an active member of EXCOMM, along 
with Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, George Ball, Bundy, Dillon, Gilpatric, Robert 
Kennedy, McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, Ted Sorensen, the Special Counsel to the President, and 
Llewellyn Thompson, the Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
184
 On the evening of October 16, 
McCone met with Albert Wheelon, the Deputy Director of Science & Technology (DD/S)
185
 and 
Chairmen of the Guided Missile & Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) and Arthur 
Lundahl, the Director of the NPIC, to create procedures for handling and reporting information 
concerning Cuba.
186
 He also approved the transfer of information to the NPIC in order to reduce 
the time it took to create intelligence reports, and established a joint committee of the major 
intelligence boards to release several estimates on the reports.
187
 At 10:30 PM, McCone 
concluded his day with a briefing with the president for further study of the photographs. 
McCone‟s managerial skills once again became apparent when he decided to delegate 
some of his authority to his deputies to allow him to focus on EXCOMM. McCone stood down 
as Chairmen of the USIB because of the conflict of interest as a member of EXCOMM charged 
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with reviewing their reports, passing that duty to Carter.
188
 He gave Lundahl greater authority at 
the NPIC by passing most of the intelligence directly to their offices to reduce the time it took to 
prepare estimates. Albert Wheelon, Chairmen of the GMAIC, took on an added role of preparing 
joint estimates from the major intelligence boards after it came to Lundahl. When Lundahl 
received the information, he passed it immediately to Cline, who then passed that information to 
McCone. When Carter received the information in the USIB meetings, he passed their 
recommendations to EXCOMM. McCone‟s delegation of authority gave him more leeway in 
making recommendations during EXCOMM meetings, while still receiving the raw intelligence 
from his deputies and the estimates from the intelligence board.
189
 
Before meeting with EXCOMM on Wednesday, October 17, McCone prepared a list of 
talking points. McCone argued, “The establishment of medium-range strike capability in Cuba 
by the Soviets was predicted by me in a least a dozen reports since the Soviet buildup was noted 
in early August.”190 McCone also believed the purposes of the missiles were to give Cuba an 
offensive power to use if attacked and to enhance the “Soviet strike capability against the United 
States.”191 McCone believed that another motive was to intimidate other Latin American nations, 
notably Mexico, from aiding in efforts against Castro. While the Soviets installed the missiles in 
Cuba, the defensive capabilities of the island continued to expand, a point that McCone reiterated 
from his earlier concerns about such an expensive missile defense system. For McCone, there 
was no doubt that despite the number of Cubans working at the sites, the missiles themselves 
remained entirely under Soviet control.
192
 The United States could not allow missiles to remain 
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in Cuba, but McCone stipulated that they could not launch a surprise attack if they wanted 
international pressure on the Soviet Union. McCone proposed sending a warning to the Soviets 
giving them twenty-four hours to remove the missiles, and proceed with a massive air attack if 
the Soviets refused.
193
  
The first meeting of EXCOMM focused on the choices available to the United States 
regarding the Cuban situation.
194
 Ball argued that any military action in Cuba would limit their 
options with their NATO allies. Further, he believed that the U.S government needed to consider 
that Khrushchev might not know what was going on in Cuba. Ball and Maxwell Taylor agreed 
that it might just be a ploy by Khrushchev to provoke an American response. McNamara avoided 
taking a position during the first meeting, wanting more time to study on all the facts available. 
Current intelligence reports showed fifty or sixty MiG-17 and MiG-19 fighters in Cuba.
195
 Soviet 
ships delivered parts for IL-28 bombers, along with at least one MiG-21 interceptor. The report 
confirmed three MRBM sites under construction, which could be ready in two weeks.
196
 The 
report showed no evidence of nuclear warhead storage sites, and failed to determine if the 
Soviets intended to place conventional or nuclear warheads on the missiles. McCone received 
reports from Lundahl on a number of crates of unknown purpose, and at least twenty-eight 
Soviet ships en route to Cuba with similar cargo. McCone argued several points from his notes, 
including how strongly he believed that the Soviets were using missiles in Cuba to force the 
United States to trade their bases in Europe. McNamara believed that they needed more 
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information on the command and control of the missiles in Cuba, and McCone promised more 
facts throughout the day.
197
 
McCone and Bundy left immediately after the meeting to confer with the president in the 
White House. The meeting focused on the intelligence-gathering actions for that day, along with 
the proposed plans of action to remove the missiles.
198
 The discussion was brief because of the 
short amount of time between meetings scheduled for that day; so, McCone only referred to 
several of his warnings that he proposed in his memorandum.
199
 McCone believed that Kennedy 
“seemed inclined to act promptly if at all, without warning, targeting on MRBM‟s and possibly 
airfields.”200 When Kennedy made the statement that a congressional resolution granted the 
president the right to attack Cuba, Bundy agreed, confirming to McCone the president‟s intent on 
action. Kennedy entrusted McCone with the role of briefing former President Eisenhower on the 
Cuban situation.
201
  
McCone immediately departed for Gettysburg, Pennsylvania to brief Eisenhower. The 
DCI met with Eisenhower to review the developments in Cuba, including all the current 
intelligence on the Soviet military buildup and the U-2 photographs of the MRBM sites.
202
 
McCone followed Kennedy‟s order not to promote a position during his meeting with 
Eisenhower, presenting many the proposals of EXCOMM members.
203
 Eisenhower had no 
problem believing that the Soviets would place offensive weapons in Cuba, because he had dealt 
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with the same ideas during his last year in office.
204
 The former president criticized the failure at 
the Bay of Pigs and the failure of MONGOOSE to remove Castro from office, especially during 
the months before the Soviets sent weapons to Cuba. He believed that an ultimatum to Castro 
and Khrushchev would fail, and that a blockade would bring difficulties of its own.
205
 McCone 
believed that Eisenhower favored military action to cut off the Cuban government with an 
invasion, ending the situation with limited bloodshed. McCone promised to keep him informed 
and consult him, whether or not he received a message from Kennedy.
206
  
McCone immediately returned to Washington to attend afternoon and evening 
EXCOMM meetings. During the meetings, the group once again discussed plans of action for 
Cuba. Ambassador Charles Bohlen, who joined EXCOMM during the first few days, argued 
against any military action in Cuba, because it would divide their allies and subject the United 
States to criticism around the world.
207
 Rusk believed that the administration should ask 
Congress for a declaration of war against Cuba, but keep their options open afterwards. Ball 
emphasized the time constraints on action, meaning that the quicker they acted the less risk it 
imposed on the United States. Kennedy wanted to know how America‟s allies, notably Turkey, 
Italy, and Britain might respond to an American response to missiles in Cuba. McNamara did not 
believe the missiles were that great a threat to the United States, and Gilpatric supported his 
opinion. McCone stated, “That McNamara‟s facts were not new as they had appeared in 
estimates months ago.”208 To McCone, the presence of those missiles in Cuba was of great 
military importance, while McNamara downplayed that point.
209
 When Bohlen and Thompson 
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questioned Soviet actions in Cuba, McCone believed that Berlin was just one of several reasons 
for the missiles being in Cuba, but that Berlin was not the primary reason for their existence. 
Despite their disagreement on the military importance of the missiles, McNamara, McCone, and 
Taylor agreed that talks with the Soviets gave Khrushchev the time to prepare the missiles for 
launch and to camouflage the sites.
210
  
After considering the military option, the group moved to the pros and cons of a naval 
blockade. The group argued over a partial or total blockade, with McCone pointing the strengths 
of a total blockade.
211
 Before the group adjourned for dinner, McCone once again argued that the 
primary goals of action in Cuba were to dispose of the missile sites and remove Castro‟s 
government from power. Rusk took charge when the meeting continued later that evening, 
stating that, “The United States cannot accept operational MRBMs in Cuba.”212 Talks gave the 
Soviets the time they needed to prepare the missiles, leaving the option of air strikes as the 
primary means of achieving their goals. Rusk proposed a timetable that began with a briefing of 
key allies followed by a series of sorties against the sites. McCone and Taylor supported the 
military strike option, while Bohlen continued to support the diplomatic route. Thompson and 
Martin supported the blockade option, while the rest of the group remained neutral on the issue, 
including Gilpatric, Johnson, Bundy, and Sorensen. Despite the difference in opinions, the group 
prepared plans for each option, including the consequences of each, allowing each member to 
promote his own views.
213
 
While McCone spent much of the evening in conference with EXCOMM, Wheelon 
prepared a memorandum for McCone containing the first in a series of combined intelligence 
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from the NPIC along with the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee 
(GMAIC) and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC). Based on the 
photographs from the U-2 flight on October 14 and the two flights from October 15, the 
committee found at least one Soviet missile regiment with eight launchers and sixteen MRBM 
missiles at two launch sites in Cuba. Because the committee believed the Soviets had 650-850 of 
such missiles, it estimated that there were probably between sixty and eighty stationed in 
Cuba.
214
 Further analysis of the photography showed two other MRBM launch sites under 
construction, bringing the total to three. The photographs from the October 14 and 15 missions 
showed remarkable building progress, including the appearance of erectors for the missiles along 
with temporary buildings and vehicles. The report stipulated that if the missiles were of the 1,020 
nautical mile range, the first of them could be operational immediately if needed.
215
 However, 
because the photos did not show the missile silhouette facing upwards, the committee argued that 
the Soviets might not have the warheads in place for use. If not ready immediately, the 
committee agreed that the missiles could become operational in a matter of days.
216
 
McCone also received an intelligence report from Lundahl on the October 15 flight. On 
the second flight on October 15, the U-2 found what appeared to a probable IRBM site under 
construction, previously reported as military equipment. The photographs showed an erector 
already in place with six missiles in the vicinity. While the report did not stipulate that the 
missiles were in fact IRBM, the construction site itself confirmed to previous Soviet 
emplacements in Eastern Europe. Lundahl met with McNamara at his home the next morning, 
which led McNamara to call McCone expressing his concern about the IRBM sites. Both 
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McNamara and McCone agreed that this intelligence “demanded more prompt and decisive 
action,” and promised to bring it up at EXCOMM meeting later that morning.217 
During the morning meeting on Thursday, October 18, McCone briefed EXCOMM on 
the intelligence reports he received Wednesday evening and on his meeting with Eisenhower. 
After briefing the group on the report from Wheeler, Lundahl delivered his report on the October 
15 photography. The president asked Lundahl if a novice could see that the pictures showed 
MRBM missiles, and Lundahl believed that they must have low-level photography for the public 
to understand the images. Rusk‟s opinion changed to promoting action against Cuba, viewing the 
island now as a “formidable military threat.”218 Rusk proposed a quick strike against the missile 
sites, believing it to be the best option despite the risk of retaliation. Thompson and Bohlen 
reiterated their previous objections to immediate military action, with Thompson pushing for a 
declaration of war from Congress if the group authorized military action, and proposed a 
blockade instead.
219
 McCone, Dillon and Taylor suggested immediate military strikes, because 
they believed that diplomatic efforts would limit the options. McNamara and Ball argued that a 
strike without warning would lead to Soviet retaliation somewhere in the world.
220
 The group 
agreed that the president should confront Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet minister of Foreign 
Affairs, on the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba. Kennedy requested that the group study 
the advantages and disadvantages to either a blockade or air strike against Cuba.
221
 
McCone joined many EXCOMM members in promoting the air strike option to remove 
the missiles from Cuba. Because McCone believed that the missiles would be operational within 
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the week, he supported the air strikes option over the blockade.
222
 One of the reasons he feared 
the Soviet missiles was his belief that the Soviet military gave more control to their battlefield 
commanders.
223
 The intelligence reports from October 18 solidified his beliefs, and led other 
members such as Dillon, Taylor, Acheson, and Bundy, along with the Joint Chiefs, to support the 
air strike option.
224
 McCone even suggested that an air strike alone could not remove all the 
missiles. He proposed an invasion of Cuba to remove the missiles and Castro‟s government.225 
By the end of the Thursday meetings, however, many EXCOMM members had moved away 
from the air strike option, due largely to arguments by Robert Kennedy and McNamara about the 
historical impact of a surprise attack.
226
 After hearing the attorney general‟s arguments, Rusk and 
Bohlen became more outspoken in their opposition to the air strikes, and instead pushed for the 
blockade options. McCone, while becoming more open to the idea of a blockade, also took a 
strong stance against Ambassador Adlai Stevenson‟s suggestion that the United States confront 
the Soviet Union at the United Nations.
227
 He continued to emphasize the problems with a 
blockade, and during the evening meeting with the president, supported the air strike option. By 
the end of the meeting, the consensus that existed earlier in the meetings broke down, leading the 
president to order them to return to their arguments, scheduled to continue on Friday morning.
228
  
McCone showed his support for the air strike during the meeting with the president, but 
understood that the group favored the blockade option.
229
 Before his meeting on Friday morning, 
McCone sent a message to the USIB, and requested an intelligence estimate to assist him in 
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future meetings. McCone believed that the group favored a blockade, and that the United States 
should declare war on Cuba only as a last resort. The limited blockade sought to prevent more 
weapons arriving in Cuba and to become a total blockade if Castro and the Soviets continued 
construction on the missile sites.
230
 McCone believed that continued surveillance was critical to 
either option, because it provided crucial information on the status of the missiles. McCone 
argued that if they chose the blockade option, it would begin with a public announcement from 
the president and limited notification of allies on Monday, October 22.
231
 It seemed to McCone 
that the air strike option was on hold until after they attempted the blockade, because many in the 
group believed an air strike and invasion was unwise. Those who supported the blockade 
believed it gave the administration the ability to increase or decrease pressure according to the 
situation, and provoke a less severe Soviet reaction. McCone argued, “The obvious 
disadvantages are the protracted nature of the operation…the action does not reverse the present 
trend of building an offensive capability within Cuba nor does it dispose of the existing missiles, 
planes and nuclear weapons.”232 However, the air strike option was a dangerous option in itself, 
because of the possibility of severe international reaction, and the possibility of a Soviet 
escalation. McCone wanted the board to give him the assistance he needed to choose the best 
options for the United States.
233
 
Following McCone‟s request, the USIB released a Special National Intelligence Estimate 
on October 19, which analyzed the possible Soviet reactions to American actions regarding 
Cuba.
234
 The board argued that the major Soviet objective in Cuba was “to demonstrate that the 
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world balance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the U.S. can no longer prevent the 
advance of Soviet offensive power even in its own hemisphere.”235 It also hypothesized that the 
Soviets might be using the missiles to force the United States into negotiations in Europe. If the 
United States did nothing about the missiles, the Soviet Union would introduce strategic nuclear 
weapons, contributing greatly to the Soviet strategic capabilities.
236
 If the administration chose to 
warn the Soviets, the board concluded, “We do not believe the Soviets would halt the 
deployment.”237 They would ask for negotiations on other foreign bases, and push for a 
resolution to the Berlin situation. If Kennedy chose to warn the Soviets, it would hinder the 
surprise air strike option.  If he chose a blockade, the Soviets would “exert strong direct 
pressures elsewhere to end the blockade.”238 If the United States launched an invasion of Cuba, it 
would force the Soviets to respond and possibly start a war. However, the board considered the 
Soviet decision to launch a war unlikely; instead, they believed they would launch an attack 
against Berlin.
239
 
Cline reported on the board‟s intelligence estimate during the Friday morning EXCOMM 
meeting.
240
 After hearing the report, Rusk argued that the president needed a legal framework if 
he launched a military invasion of Cuba. After deliberations, many in the group supported the 
idea of rationalizing action in Cuba as self-defense. On the issue of a warning, McCone 
stipulated that a warning did not improve their position and possibly hindered it.
241
 If they 
decided to support a defensive blockade of Cuba, it would involve force, which the United 
Nations charter prohibited except in certain situations. Martin proposed a solution to the United 
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Nations Charter: a unanimous vote from the Organization of American States (OAS). It would 
give the president a legal framework for an air strike, invasion, or blockade.
242
 
After the group discussed the legal ramifications of the actions for Cuba, it renewed its 
disagreements on either an air strike or a blockade.
243
 According to Robert Kennedy, “the strain 
and the hours without sleep were beginning to take their toll.”244 Bundy questioned the reasons 
why the group recommended a blockade to the president the night before. He asked for further 
deliberations on both suggestions, because of the problems inherent with both. A blockade did 
not remove the missiles, meaning they needed something more substantial. He moved to support 
the air strikes, because he supported decisive action.
245
 Acheson agreed, and stated, “Khrushchev 
has presented the United States with a direct challenge, we were involved in a test of wills, and 
the sooner we got to a showdown the better.”246 Dillon and McCone agreed with Acheson, which 
divided the group once again. Taylor believed that supporting a blockade would be “a decision to 
abandon the possibility of an air strike.”247 He supported the air strike option, an option that 
required the president to make a quick decision.
248
 
While many of the group migrated back to air strikes, McNamara supported the blockade 
alternative but suggested that the military prepare for the air strikes if the president chose that 
option. Robert Kennedy also supported the blockade, because an air strike had too many 
implications for international opinion, and went against the traditions of the United States. 
Besides killing many Cubans, it would kill many Soviet personnel as well. Arguments continued 
into the afternoon, when Rusk pointed out that the group‟s duty was to present the president with 
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the best options for his consideration. He proposed two working groups, each tasked with writing 
papers on the advantages and disadvantages to their assigned option. Johnson headed the 
blockade group, composed of Thompson, Martin, Gilpatric, and Meeker, while Bundy was to 
head the air strike group, which contained Dillon, Acheson and Taylor. Despite his belief that the 
air strike option posed the best course of action for the president, McCone remained off the air 
strike group due to his position in the intelligence community.
249
 
During the course of the day, McCone shifted his support away from the air strike option, 
but did not fully support the blockade.
250
 After the two groups deliberated on their course of 
action, the EXCOMM reconvened at 4:00 AM. At that time, each group voiced their proposal, 
after which each member showed their support or criticism for the plan.
251
 The group began with 
the blockade proposal, where criticism led to many changes in the original plan. First, the group 
agreed there was not enough time to have everything ready for the president to make an address 
on Sunday. Legally, Thompson stipulated that they needed twenty-four hours between 
Kennedy‟s address and enforcement of the blockade, to allow the Soviet commanders the time 
needed to inform their ships.
252
 The blockade plan also contained a list of actions needed to 
ensure success of the operation, including a scenario that mapped out the blockade and 
international reactions.
253
 Around 6:00 PM, the group moved to the air strike proposal, where 
Bundy detailed the plan in a relatively short time, allowing the group to attack their plan as 
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well.
254
 After each group voiced their plans, there was general agreement that either option posed 
its own risks, including the possibility of the Soviets forcing the United States to give up the 
missile bases in Turkey and Italy.
255
 At this point, McNamara made an important statement that 
calmed many of the air strike proponents. He stated, “An air strike could be made some time 
after the blockade was instituted in the event the blockade did not produce results as to the 
missile bases in Cuba.”256 When Robert Kennedy voiced his support for McNamara‟s proposal 
towards the end of the meeting, McCone noted a great shift in the group towards a blockade.
257
  
 Later on Friday evening, the joint intelligence committee released another evaluation 
based on the ten separate U-2 missions from October 14 to October 17. The committee reported 
that the October 16 flights confirmed the existence of three MRBM sites and two IRBM sites.
258
 
Current intelligence showed the sites manned by Soviet personnel, but they did not know if 
regional forces or Soviet high command had direct control of their use. One key component to 
the Wednesday intelligence was the identification of a nuclear warhead storage site near the most 
completed construction site at Guanajay.
259
 The committee believed that the warheads could 
already be in Cuba, despite the lack of photography on an operational nuclear storage site. At 
present, intelligence photographs showed twenty-four launchers when completed, each with the 
ability to fire multiple missiles. More missiles arrived during the week onboard the freighter 
Poltava.
260
 Of the twenty-six SAM sites located in Cuba, intelligence reported 16 operational 
batteries. For the coastal defense sites, the committee believed two were operational.
261
 The most 
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startling revelation came from “several refugee reports indicating the presence of tactical 
(FROG
262
) missiles in Cuba.”263 With the increased rate of deployment during the past week of 
reconnaissance, the committee believed that the Soviets were trying to “achieve quick 
operational status and then a complete site construction” as soon as possible.264 
McCone received an addendum to the Joint Evaluation from Lundahl that same evening, 
indicating the presence of both MRBM and IRBM missile sites.
265
 The following morning, 
McCone met with Dave Boyle, one of the NPIC ballistic missile experts, who showed him the 
construction sites that conformed to previous IRBM sites in Eastern Europe. Following that 
briefing, McCone traveled with Cline and Lundahl to another meeting with the president at 
2:30.
266
 This meeting had a particular importance because the president, his advisors, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the regular EXCOMM members were meeting to give their reports on 
blockade or air strikes.
267
 McCone instructed Cline to brief the group on the Joint Evaluation 
from October 19, and Lundahl showed the locations of both the MRBM and IRBM sites. Current 
intelligence showed sixteen SS-4 MRBMs, aimed towards the central United States.
268
 
McNamara argued that despite the disagreements in the group on plans of action, the military 
commanders were ready to implement either option.
269
 The blockade option “aimed at 
preventing any addition to the strategic missiles already deployed to Cuba and eventually to 
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eliminate these missiles.”270 Following the investigation, they would negotiate for removal of all 
missiles in Cuba, which might include a trade with the missiles in Turkey and Italy. One of the 
key problems with the blockade was the length of time it took to achieve their objective of 
removing the missiles from Cuba. The blockade also risked “serious political trouble in the 
United States” and a weakening of the U.S. international position.271 However, the blockade did 
have the advantage of doing less damage to America‟s allies in Europe, and allowed the United 
States to maintain its traditions against surprise attacks and leadership in the Free World. Taylor 
and the Joint Chiefs opposed the blockade option and argued, “Now was the time to act because 
this would be the last chance we would have to destroy the missiles.”272  
After arguments from Rusk, Ball, and Taylor, and Sorensen, Bundy detailed the air strike 
proposal.
273
 Robert Kennedy informed the president that the plan had the support of Bundy, 
Taylor, the Joint Chiefs, while Dillon and McCone supported parts of the plan.
274
 Taylor argued 
that the air strikes gave them the chance to take out the missiles, the IL-28 bombers, and the 
SAM sites. McNamara again cautioned the president that an air strike might not remove all the 
missiles, which Taylor countered with the argument that not removing those weapons meant the 
United States had to invent new procedures for dealing with military threats. Robert Kennedy 
argued that the air strikes were an option if the blockade failed, which McCone supported. 
McCone argued that Kennedy should issue an ultimatum “that if the missiles were not 
dismantled within seventy-two hours, the United States would destroy the missiles by air 
attack.”275 McCone along with Dillon suggested that a long blockade without action gave the 
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Cubans the time needed to fire the nuclear missiles at the United States, and threatened their 
relationship with their Latin American allies. A limited use of force in a blockade made it much 
more difficult for a military strike because of the time needed to implement the blockade and 
measure its effectiveness.
276
 
 Towards the end of the meeting, Stevenson again argued for a diplomatic solution 
involving the United Nations. This had the effect of turning most of the Council‟s attentions 
from their own opinions to criticize Stevenson‟s position.277 Taylor, Dillon and McCone argued 
against the diplomatic solution as well as Stevenson‟s claim that there might be no nuclear 
weapons in Cuba. While McCone admitted there was no photographic evidence of nuclear 
warheads in Cuba, he referred to Stevenson as the “St. Thomas of the generation.”278 When 
Robert Kennedy pushed to have Stevenson replaced on the UN council, McCone suggested John 
McCloy, which the president approved.
279
 McCone also requested that the president allow the 
CIA to send copies of the aerial photography to allies in Western Europe, even suggesting 
sending a CIA officer along with the brief.
280
 He suggested Tidwell to brief the Canadian 
government first, giving the administration the chance to gain support from its allies before 
taking action. Kennedy requested that Ball, Johnson, and Martin prepare a detailed timeline for 
briefing all the groups suggested by McCone.
281
 The president concluded the meeting by 
authorizing plans for both options, as well as informing the group of his decision to address the 
nation on Monday evening.
282
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By the end of the meeting, Kennedy had made his decision that the blockade was the best 
option available. As the administration informed key allies about the missiles, McCone secured 
more intelligence reports and estimates from the intelligence committees. The USIB released 
another Special National Security Estimate while EXCOMM deliberated with the president. 
After the committee reported on the current status of the weapons in Cuba, along with the 
purposes of these weapons, the group analyzed the options provided by McCone‟s notes, 
providing several consequences to each action. If the United States failed to confront the Soviets 
on the missiles, the Soviets most likely would continue the buildup indefinitely.
283
 It believed no 
action by the Kennedy administration would provide encouragement to communist movements 
around the world and cause considerable damage to American power. A simple warning would 
not remove the missiles, and perhaps would lead to negotiations for concessions.
284
 On the issue 
of the blockade, even a total blockade would not prevent the Soviets from using submarines to 
deliver nuclear warheads. The presence of a blockade would place considerable pressure on the 
Soviet government. It would require direct action to remove Castro‟s regime, not a blockade.285 
If the president chose the air strike option, it would have a much greater chance of provoking the 
Soviet Union, by forcing the Soviets to attack the United States somewhere in the world. General 
war became a real possibility if the United States chose to attack, but the board stipulated that 
they did not believe the Soviet Union would directly attack the United States.
286
 
McCone also received the Joint Committee‟s analysis on the U-2 flights up to October 
18. At the two MRBM sites first discovered, it appeared that they were nearly ready for 
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deployment, with visible signs of launch crews, missiles, and other military equipment.
287
 The 
committee argued that according to the recent photography, “an emergency operational 
capability to launch some of the missiles on hand with about 8 hours [of preparation] could now 
exist at the four MRBM sites.”288 If construction proceeded at the current pace, the committee 
believed all the missiles at Site 1 and Site 2 would be ready for launch by Thursday, October 25. 
At the third MRBM site in the Sagua La Grande region, photography showed portions of the 
missile regiment arrived on October 17, but was not ready for more than an emergency 
deployment before November 1. The speed of construction at the fourth MRBM site in the 
Guanajay area showed a much higher construction rate than previous Soviet efforts, with control 
bunkers, blast walls, and concrete all visible from the photography. However, the board did not 
believe that the missiles would be ready for launch at the IRBM sites until December. The last 
flight on October 17 also confirmed the presence of nuclear storage sites under construction, 
along with an unidentified SSM site in the Remedios area.
289
  
Before McCone met with Kennedy on Sunday morning, October 21, he received another 
detailed report from Carter and the USIB, which confirmed that two missile sites were 
operational.
290
 Similar to their October 20 Special estimate, Carter informed McCone that the 
construction efforts and presence of guided missiles in Cuba meant that the Soviets had been 
planning the operation for at least a year.
291
 Reports showed that the parts to assemble 22 light 
bombers and 40 MiG-21 fighters were present in Cuba.
292
 Carter confirmed the joint committee‟s 
report there was no evidence of an operational nuclear storage site to date, but stipulated they 
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might also be in Cuba already, coming through the Port of Mariel and passing through several 
checkpoints near the missile sites.
293
 Along with twenty-four SAM sites and three coastal 
defense missile sites, current intelligence showed twelve guided missile patrol boats in Cuba.
294
 
After receiving all the reports from the USIB and the Joint Committee and having a brief 
conversation with Eisenhower, McCone attended an EXCOMM meeting with Kennedy later that 
morning. According to McCone, McNamara and Taylor argued that the air strikes themselves 
would only destroy ninety percent of the missiles and that an advance warning would give the 
Soviets time to move the missiles to undisclosed locations.
295
 General Walter Sweeney
296
 
detailed the plans for the air strike per the president‟s suggestion, and the group decided that an 
air strike must include missile sites, airfields, and SAM sites. Taylor and McNamara argued that 
if the president decided to authorize the attacks, they must begin by Monday morning. The 
president then asked for McCone‟s opinion, and McCone advised against a surprise attack, 
agreeing with Robert Kennedy‟s reasoning from the prior meetings.297 McCone reiterated his 
opinion that the President should issue a public statement that the United States would remove 
the missiles if intelligence showed they were not removing them.
298
 
At 4:30 PM, McCone met in private with the president on Eisenhower‟s 
recommendations on the blockade. He noted that he received an intelligence report from Lundahl 
that morning, followed by his meeting with Eisenhower. McCone and Eisenhower discussed the 
procedures for either the blockade or the air strike option, to which the former President 
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supported the air strikes from a military point of view but not from the broader international 
considerations. Eisenhower believed that the air strikes by themselves were never conclusive, 
and a surprise attack set a precedent to the world that other nations might follow.
299
 Eisenhower 
agreed that the situation called for a warning to the Soviets prior to either option and favored the 
use of a blockade and eventual air strikes if the Soviets kept the missiles in Cuba. McCone told 
Kennedy that because Eisenhower had only certain information on the Soviet buildup, it was 
important to understand that his opinion represented “a flash judgment rather than considered 
judgment” on the former President‟s part.300  
After the briefing, Kennedy requested that McCone also brief Vice President Johnson. At 
8:30 PM, McCone had Lundahl brief the Johnson on the current photography from Cuba and 
discussed the president‟s proposed speech. Johnson believed a surprise attack was the best option 
and questioned the use of a blockade followed by air strikes and invasion.
301
 He believed that a 
warning limited the effectiveness of the air strikes, and argued that the blockade might not work. 
McCone countered Johnson‟s arguments with his briefing paper from the October 20 EXCOMM 
meeting. After learning of EXCOMM‟s conclusions and Eisenhower‟s recommendations, 
Johnson agreed to accept the blockade option.
302
 
After his meeting with Johnson, McCone received another evaluation from the Joint 
Committee, focused on the status of the missile sites in Cuba. Based on the missions of October 
18 and 19, the committee believed that the current MRBM sites had the ability to launch eighty 
missiles, with each launcher reloading once.
303
 Photographs showed eight Soviet missile 
regiments, each with eight launchers and at least sixteen missiles each. It was clear to the 
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committee that the Soviets wanted to have all the sites ready for full operation, rather than 
prepare the sites for emergency launches.
304
 Lundahl provided McCone with the readout from 
the last mission on October 19, which showed another confirmed MRBM site, bringing the total 
to five MRBM sites and two IRBM sites in Cuba. Each site showed missile trailers, erectors, and 
support vehicles, with construction at each site continuing at an accelerated pace.
305
  
McCone requested that Cline prepare a briefing for the president during the afternoon 
meeting with EXCOMM on the intelligence readouts received over the past week. He reported 
on seventeen separate U-2 flights from October 14 to October 20, which confirmed twenty-four 
launchers for MRBM missiles at six sites, and 12 launchers for IRBM sites located at three 
bases. Photography showed between over thirty missiles currently in Cuba, with no evidence of 
IRBMs among them.
306
 The report showed four MRBM sites believed to be operational, with the 
remaining two sites expected to be operational by October 25. McCone also informed 
EXCOMM that the CIA received a report that a fleet of Soviet submarines was en route to Cuba 
and expected to arrive within the week.
307
 Kennedy ordered the group to “sing one song in order 
to make clear that there was now no difference among his advisers as to the proper course to 
follow.”308 Kennedy then read a list of questions, asking the group to prepare answers should the 
press ask the members. Because the blockade plans allowed shipments of food and medicine to 
continue to Cuba, the president stipulated that the group should show the differences between the 
Cuban blockade and the Berlin blockade.
309
 McNamara agreed with Kennedy that the Defense 
Department should prepare for air strikes and the invasion should the blockade fail, but did not 
                                                 
304
 “Supplement 2 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba, 21 October 1962 [Excerpt],” in ibid., 261-
262. 
305
 Ibid. 
306
 Cline, “DD/I Notes for DCI for NSC Briefing at 3 PM in Cabinet Room, 22 October 1962,” in ibid., 271-273. 
307
 “Minutes of the 507th Meeting of the National Security Council,” October 22, 1962, U.S. Department of State, 
FRUS, Vol. XI, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frus.html (accessed September 23, 2010). 
308
 Ibid. 
309
 Ibid. 
64 
 
want to authorize activation of the reserves. Kennedy argued that he chose the blockade option 
over the air strike option because the air strikes would not remove all the missiles.
310
 Failure to 
destroy all the missiles would allow the Soviets time to use the remaining missiles to attack the 
United States. However, because they might use air strikes in the future, the president agreed 
with Bundy not to discuss that fact with the public.
311
 
The president had his final briefing with EXCOMM and members of the Senate at 5:00 
PM before he addressed the nation. Having made his decision to authorize the blockade, the 
meeting centered on the Soviet responses to the blockade. McCone had the task of repeating to 
the group the intelligence reports from that morning, and the president reviewed the situation 
over the last 8 days.  After informing the attendees of the steps taken regarding Cuba, Senator 
Richard Russell of Georgia wanted Kennedy to consider stronger steps than currently taken.
312
 
Similar to Vice President Johnson, Russell believed a warning message hindered their options in 
Cuba.  McNamara described for Russell that an attack on Cuba would follow the blockade 
should it fail.
313
 Other members of the group began asking questions, pertaining to the impact of 
the blockade verses the air strikes. Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright also questioned the 
president‟s decision to impose a blockade instead of invading Cuba, while Congressman Carl 
Vinson of Georgia urged Kennedy to strike with the maximum force available. Except for the 
members of EXCOMM, most of the attendees of the meeting challenged the president‟s 
decision.
314
 According to McCone, “the president took issue with Fulbright, stating that he felt 
that an attack on these bases…would involve large numbers of Soviet casualties and this would 
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be more provocative than a confrontation with a Soviet ship.”315 Slightly angered but determined 
in his course, the president left the meeting to prepare for the speech that would set the stage for 
one of the crucial confrontations of the Cold War. 
The United States discovered the missiles in Cuba while McCone traveled to the West 
Coast to bury his stepson. When he arrived back in Washington on October 17, he immediately 
delegated his authority as head of the intelligence community to his deputies, to allow the major 
intelligence-gathering services to issue reports on intelligence at a quickened pace. He helped 
establish the Joint Committee on Recent Intelligence, authorized Lundahl to take over the 
analysis of U-2 photography at the NPIC, requested that Cline brief EXCOMM on the 
intelligence, and ordered Carter to take over his place as Chairmen of the USIB. These decisions 
allowed him to concentrate on the policy decisions during EXCOMM meetings while still 
receiving intelligence reports as they arrived. McCone spent much of the first week of the crisis 
in meetings with EXCOMM, determining what course of action Kennedy needed to take to 
ensure the removal of the missiles from Cuba. He also had the important role of briefing former 
President Eisenhower on the situation. Because of McCone‟s coordination of intelligence 
organization during the first week of the crisis, Kennedy and EXCOMM had the information 
they needed to make informed decisions when dealing with the Soviet government. 
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CHAPTER THREE: John McCone and the Climax of the Cold War  
After a week of lengthy deliberations with EXCOMM, President Kennedy decided that 
the best course of action to confront the Soviet missile threat in Cuba was to initiate a blockade 
of Cuba. The president informed the American public of his decision during a televised address 
on Monday evening, October 22. For the next week of the crisis, McCone continued to receive 
detailed intelligence estimates and reports from the committees he established at the beginning of 
the crisis. He kept many members of Congress and the press informed on the crisis, and gave 
U.S. Ambassador Stevenson the support of his deputies Ray Cline and Arthur Lundahl to answer 
any questions on the evidence presented during the United Nations discussions. Because of his 
own personal involvement in EXCOMM and the strain of the crisis, McCone requested that 
Cline prepare official CIA briefings containing all current intelligence. After Khrushchev made 
his decision to end the crisis by removing the missiles, McCone pressed the intelligence 
community and the administration to maintain its intelligence mission in Cuba to insure that the 
Soviet Union was removing the missiles as pledged. By early November, the intelligence 
community confirmed to McCone that the Soviets were indeed removing the offensive weapons 
from Cuba, and the crisis officially ended. McCone briefed members of Congress and the press, 
advised the government on the intelligence, and advocated continued intelligence operations in 
Cuba until the Soviets removed the missiles. 
In his radio and television on Monday night, October 22, the president assured the people 
that the government “has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on 
the island of Cuba.”316 The president confirmed that the United States had conclusive evidence 
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of offensive missile sites in Cuba. He told the American people that his administration received 
the first reports of the missiles on Tuesday morning, October 15, and increased the surveillance 
of Cuba thereafter. He explained that the MRBM sites in Cuba had the ability to launch nuclear 
warheads at Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, along with any city in the 
southeastern United States and Central America. The sites still under construction were for 
IRBMs, each with twice the range of the MRBMs, able to attack targets from Canada to Peru.
317
 
He stressed the establishment of a missile base in Cuba represented a serious threat to the 
security of the Western Hemisphere, and that the Kremlin had deliberately lied by claiming 
earlier “that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character.”318  
Because of the pace of construction and the size of the project in Cuba, the president 
believed the Soviets must have made the decision long before the introduction of the missiles. 
Kennedy confirmed, “Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid offensive buildup was 
already in my mind, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was 
instructed to make it clear once again…that Soviet assistance to Cuba pursued solely the purpose 
of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba.”319 Because of the presence of missiles in 
Cuba, the president insisted, “Neither the United States nor the world community can tolerate 
deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small.”320 If the 
Soviets maintained the missiles in Cuba, they represented a “clear and present danger” designed 
to be “a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be 
accepted by any country.”321 
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After Kennedy described the Soviet buildup in Cuba, he detailed the American response 
to Soviet actions. He promised to halt the Soviet buildup with a “strict quarantine of all offensive 
military equipment under shipment to Cuba.”322 If needed, the government could expand the 
quarantine to include other types of cargo but would not restrict the flow of food and supplies to 
the island. While the Navy instituted the blockade, the administration planned to continue the 
increased surveillance of Cuba, and if the Soviets continued construction of the missiles, 
resolution of the crisis might require further action. To discourage the Soviet government from 
underestimating the resolve of the United States, Kennedy argued, “It shall be the policy of this 
Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western 
Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States.”323 In case the situation 
escalated, the president placed the military on standby alert and removed non-essential personnel 
from Guantanamo Bay. Kennedy also called for a meeting with the Organization of American 
States (OAS) to consider the threat to their nations and to give the United States the legal means 
to protect the hemisphere. Finally, he urged Khrushchev to remove the missiles from Cuba that 
threatened the stability of the region and relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Kennedy left no doubt that the United States and its people faced a difficult task, but 
argued that the United States did not enter the fight for victory, but for freedom and peace in the 
hemisphere and the world.
324
  
While the president addressed the nation, the Joint Committee released their daily 
evaluation on the intelligence gathered from the U-2 flights of October 20. For the first time in 
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the crisis, the U-2 photography did not discover any new missile sites under construction.
325
 
However, the photography showed an increased number of missiles and launchers at the sites. 
The readout showed three additional MRBMs and four additional launchers, bringing the total to 
thirty-three MRBMs along with twenty-three launchers.
326
 The U-2 discovered another SAM site 
as well, bringing the total to twenty-four operational SAM sites.
327
 The photography showed no 
IRBMs in Cuba, and still no information on the presence of nuclear warheads.
328
 The National 
Security Agency (NSA) also released an intelligence report that showed several Soviet ships had 
reversed course during the evening and headed back to the Soviet Union.
329
 McCone received 
word of these reports the following morning, before his meeting with EXCOMM. 
After McCone received the intelligence reports from the NSA and the Joint Committee, 
he promised to bring them up during his EXCOMM briefing. Along with a report on Soviet 
ships, McCone showed increased evidence that the Soviets controlled the missile sites in Cuba 
without Cuban personnel. McCone then asked Lundahl to show the group the photographs from 
the recent U-2 missions.
330
 Lundahl confirmed that the missions from October 14-20 covered 
ninety-seven percent of the island, and showed several MRBM launchers possibly ready for 
launch in a matter of minutes.
331
 Robert Kennedy asked why intelligence reports failed to 
discover the operational missiles earlier, to which McCone argued that the rapid pace of 
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construction led to the sudden discovery of the operational launchers.
332
 McCone asked the 
group to allow him to brief certain members of the Senate and members of the press, which 
EXCOMM approved.
333
 The committee then discussed the steps needed to establish the 
blockade. McNamara wanted to inform the Soviets on the exact time the blockade was to begin, 
and created plans to intercept the closest Soviet ships when the blockade began.
334
 The president 
decided that if the OAS approved the blockade, it would begin on Wednesday morning, October 
24.
335
  
Following this discussion, the group considered the implications of the Soviets deciding 
to initiate a blockade or launch an attack against the United States or NATO. McCone believed 
that the Soviets might launch a blockade of West Berlin, and had a greater chance of capitulating 
before the Cubans.
336
 McNamara wanted a policy in place to inform the chain of command so 
they could quickly respond to any attack.
337
 If the Soviets launched an attack on the 
reconnaissance planes, the president approved the use of attack aircraft to destroy any SAM site 
that engaged them. Taylor ordered eight attack aircraft be ready to launch immediately, and the 
Navy prepared to conduct search and rescue operations in case the pilot survived the attack. To 
limit the U-2‟s vulnerability to fighters, Kennedy authorized the CIA and Department of Defense 
to monitor air traffic in and around Cuba, and keep the U-2 away from any reported buildup.
338
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The group also authorized several low-level reconnaissance flights to prepare the ordnance 
required to destroy the missile sites.
339
  
Stevenson argued that it was extremely important that the National Photographic 
Intelligence Center (NPIC) and his office continue to receive new reconnaissance pictures as 
soon as possible. McCone agreed to send copies of the relevant photography to Stevenson.
340
 
Ball conveyed to the group Stevenson‟s concerns about not having enough evidence to bring to 
the United Nations Security Council meeting. Stevenson proposed one large map showing the 
locations of the missile sites, photographs of the construction, a list of all the missile sites, and 
prior images gathered from U-2 reconnaissance over IRBM and MRBM sites in the Soviet 
Union. McCone decided to accept all of Stevenson‟s requests except for the prior photographs of 
missiles in Soviet territory, and ordered Lundahl and Cline to report to the UN to answer 
Stevenson‟s questions.341 After McCone‟s suggestion to send Lundahl and Cline to the UN, 
Bundy suggested that each member of EXCOMM have a staff member as an aide. The group 
accepted McCone‟s suggestion to have Carter confer with members of the State Department and 
the Department of Defense to find the best candidates for the positions.
342
 
At the conclusion of the EXCOMM meeting, McCone returned to CIA headquarters to 
brief members of the press.
343
 He answered questions from Arthur Krock
344
 on the blockade, 
other options open to the president, and some of the background leading up to that decision.
345
 
After his briefing, McCone stated, “Krock seemed in general agreement with the course of 
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action.”346 Later that afternoon, McCone received calls from David Lawrence347 and Paul 
Scott
348
 on the Cuban situation. McCone showed them several photographs to convince them the 
evidence existed for their actions in Cuba.
349
 Lawrence and Scott wanted to know why the 
intelligence community did not know sooner about the buildup in Cuba, and how Senator 
Kenneth Keating
350
 received intelligence information in August and September.
351
 McCone 
explained the reasons for the intelligence problems and the timing of the President‟s response, 
but said nothing about Keating‟s statements.352 Lawrence and Scott argued that members of the 
administration informed the press that no offensive weapons were in Cuba, even after the White 
House received the contrary reports during the prior week.
353
 The two columnists believed that 
the White House briefings over the last week misled the press, and they questioned the decision 
to have those briefings.
354
  
McCone had another conversation with Scott, where Scott attacked McCone‟s creation of 
the Board of National Estimates (BNE) because of its failures to predict the placement of 
missiles in Cuba. Scott told McCone, “I guess we‟re going to have to blow you out of this 
(waters) for not reorganizing your estimating process.”355 He quoted from the October 4 estimate 
and argued that the estimate mislead the government into believing that the Soviets did not 
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intend to place missiles in Cuba.
356
 He called the estimate “reckless,”357 and “was just another 
example of how the CIA estimating processes were not objective and served special interests.” 
Despite the fact that McCone tried for weeks to make the Board consider the possibility of 
missiles in Cuba, McCone told Scott that he knew nothing of the estimates.
358
 When he to the 
CIA, he wrote, “I have been forced to defend the Executive Branch of the Government and CIA 
against the questions (1) why did we not know about this sooner and (2) did we not estimate or 
forecast this eventuality.”359 
After the clash with Scott, McCone had similar briefings with Senator Bourke 
Hicklenlooper, Senator Russell, and Congressmen Vinson.
360
 After briefing Russell, McCone 
noted that while the senator was outspoken during the meeting with the president on Monday 
evening, the Georgia Democrat, “indicated a less critical attitude towards Administration 
policy.”361 Russell approved the decision of the administration, but questioned the effectiveness 
of a blockade and the political consequences for American/Soviet relations.
362
 He believed that 
an air strike and invasion were the next crucial steps after the blockade.
363
 Senator 
Hicklenlooper, a Colorado Republican, shared Russell‟s support for the president‟s speech and 
choices, as well as concerns that the president‟s advisors might pressure Kennedy to take a 
weaker position in Cuba.
364
 McCone believed that the speech eased the senator‟s concerns, and 
seemed more satisfied with the president‟s course of action than during the meeting on Monday 
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night.
365
 Congressman Vinson, another Georgia Democrat, felt that the president made an 
excellent speech, but believed military action was the next step if the blockade failed to produce 
results.
366
 Vinson reviewed the naval situation with McCone, and insisted that the blockade be 
effective, and preparations for a swift attack be in place to remove Castro. After the meetings, 
McCone pointed out that Vinson and Russell “were very inquisitive as to the position of the joint 
chiefs.”367 McCone defended Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairmen Taylor and other supporters 
of the quick action group, as well as the civilian administration‟s decision for the blockade. 
McCone told the men, “It must also be recognized that civilians with broader responsibilities, i.e. 
military and political as well, necessarily had to moderate the JCS view.”368 While Russell, 
Hicklenlooper, and Vinson all supported the decision not to launch a surprise attack, Russell “felt 
that a warning and a following military operation might have been preferable to a blockade.”369 
Once again, McCone defended the administration by pointing to the fact that the administration 
had given the Soviets a clear warning in the speech, while leaving open the option for further 
action.
370
 
McCone returned to the White House for another EXCOMM meeting at 6:00 PM. It was 
during this meeting that Kennedy signed the documents authorizing the blockade and other 
assets needed for the operation.
371
 After McCone showed the preliminary reports from the low-
level flights over Cuba, the president approved retaliatory strikes against Soviet defenses if they 
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fired on the reconnaissance aircraft and signed the official document authorizing the Joint Chiefs 
to take action in the event of an attack.
372
 Rusk reported that the OAS made a unanimous 
decision to support the American blockade, giving the United States the legal support needed for 
the operation.
373
 In response to the decision by the OAS, Kennedy told McNamara to review all 
relevant details with the Fleet Commanders to ensure that the Navy followed his instructions.
374
 
The group discussed the actions needed to combat Soviet resistance, including the failure of a 
community ship to stop, the refusal then to allow boarding, or the Soviet captain‟s decision to 
reverse course.  
Assistant Secretary Steuart Pittman
375
 moved the discussion towards protection of the 
southeastern United States in the event the president authorized the invasion of Cuba.
376
 Pittman 
reported that if the Soviets launched the missiles from Cuba, only 40 million Americans out of 
92 million residing in the southeastern United States had a chance of reaching fallout shelters.
377
 
Pittman‟s reports worried Kennedy.378 In response, Kennedy asked for emergency steps, but 
McCone believed “that not very much could or would be done; that whatever was done would 
involve a great deal of publicity and public alarm.”379 Because of McNamara‟s plan to leave the 
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meeting at 7:00, McCone urged the president to allow him to give his intelligence appraisal of 
the situation, because he believed that some of the items in the reports from the intelligence 
community might be significant in McNamara‟s briefing to Fleet Commanders.380  
At the conclusion of McCone‟s intelligence report, Kennedy was satisfied with the plans 
for the blockade, and signed the executive order authorizing the blockade for Wednesday 
morning, October 24.
381
 At 6:51 PM, he dispatched a message to Chairmen Khrushchev, stating, 
“I think you will recognize that the steps which started the current chain of events was [sic] the 
action of your Government in secretly furnishing offensive weapons to Cuba. I hope that you 
will issue immediately the necessary instructions to your ships to observe the terms of the 
quarantine.”382  
McCone spent the remainder of the evening receiving intelligence estimates and reports 
he requested from the BNE and the Joint Committee. He received an estimate from Abbott 
Smith, the Acting Chairmen of the BNE, on the blockade‟s probable effects on Cuba.383 SMith 
believed there would be no challenge to the Navy on October 24 and 25, but after that point the 
Soviets could decide to engage the blockade fleet if their political efforts failed. Smith‟s 
summary noted that the Soviets might stage an incident using a ship with non-military cargo and 
force the United States to attack the vessel. If the attack failed to end the blockade, the board 
agreed that the Soviets might attack Berlin in retaliation.
384
 After its analysis of Soviet 
statements, the report argued that the Soviets wanted to keep their options open by avoiding 
incidents but would employ submarines to protect the Soviet ships and deliver critical items 
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needed to complete the missile construction. If the Soviets decided to retaliate, they would attack 
either a U.S. ship or the access routes to Berlin, but Smith stipulated that despite the board‟s 
recommendations on possible Soviet retaliation, most members of the board believed the Soviets 
would not take military action.
385
 
McCone also received the daily evaluation from the Joint Committee on the U-2 flights 
of Monday, October 23. At McCone‟s suggestion, the committee focused its evaluation on the 
completion status of the missiles, along with any changes found from the low-level 
photography.
386
 The Soviets continued construction at the rapid pace identified during the 
weekend, and the committee expected the completion of all the MRBM sites within the week.
387
 
Neither the U-2 nor the RF-8s located any additional missiles, transports or launchers on 
Monday, and showed no new missile sites under construction.
388
 The new photography also 
confirmed that while there were no IRBMs present at the construction sites, there were 
increasing efforts to camouflage equipment at those sites.
389
 The committee confirmed earlier 
reports that several ships suspected of carrying missiles had reversed their courses, and it still 
had not discovered any definite nuclear warhead storage bunkers.
390
 The committee believed that 
while there was no evidence of nuclear warheads on the island, several Soviet transport aircraft 
could also deliver up to ten nuclear warheads at a time while remaining hidden from 
intelligence.
391
 
At 10:00 AM on Wednesday, October 24, EXCOMM met in the situation room at the 
White House. At the beginning of the meeting, McCone delivered the two intelligence reports he 
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received the prior evening. After McCone‟s briefing, McNamara outlined his efforts to defend 
the American bases in the southeastern United States.
392
 McNamara showed photographs of the 
dispersal of U.S. aircraft, while Taylor outlined the procedures to decrease the time needed to 
respond during a missile attack.
393
 McNamara then recounted his meetings with Fleet 
Commanders, and their recommendations for naval interception of suspected ships. McNamara 
also provided evidence that Soviet submarines escorted some of the ships suspected of carrying 
missiles, meaning that the president might have to authorize the ships to attack those submarines 
during the boarding process.
394
 As the mood in the situation room intensified, McCone reported, 
“Mr. President, we have a preliminary report which seems to indicate that some of the Soviet 
ships have stopped dead in the water.”395After hearing McCone‟s report, Kennedy made the 
decision to halt the interception of any Soviet ships for at least an hour.
396
 At the conclusion of 
the meeting, Kennedy authorized McCone, Rusk, and McNamara to take immediate action to 
improve communications in the Caribbean area in order to decrease the time needed to formulate 
a response to any Soviet attack on the blockade fleet.
397
 
Most EXCOMM members spent the rest of the day dealing with the blockade. McCone 
received several intelligence reports that the Soviet ships had indeed reversed course, along with 
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intelligence on the Soviet construction efforts in Cuba.
398
 The next day, he delivered his all the 
relevant intelligence as of 6:00 AM that morning. The intelligence reports confirmed that 
fourteen out of the twenty-two ships presently on course for Cuba reversed their course.
399
 
However, eight ships appeared to be continuing their approach to Cuba, five of which were 
tankers.  Despite the tense situation and repeated threats from the Soviet leadership, McCone 
confirmed that, “We still see no signs of any crash procedure in measures to increase the 
readiness of Soviet armed forces.”400 Kennedy requested that McCone prepare another 
intelligence memorandum, detailing the political situation in Cuba and the effectiveness of 
dropping leaflets over the island.
401
 Rusk asked McCone for answers regarding any changes to 
the course of the ships returning to the Soviet Union, the destination of Soviet ships bound for 
other nations besides Cuba, and the reaction of the Cuban public to American actions. McCone 
promised answers to those questions during subsequent meetings.
402
  
After the intelligence briefing, McNamara reported that an American destroyer 
intercepted the tanker Bucharest earlier that morning. The destroyer hailed the vessel asking 
what is was transporting, and discovered from its captain that it carried petroleum.
403
 Because it 
contained only fuel, the group decided to keep the vessel under close surveillance rather than 
board it.
404
 When the president asked the status of other ships en route to Cuba, McCone 
informed him that a number of those ships in the Eastern Atlantic had changed course, but 
needed more time to gather information on the Soviet ships in the Pacific. Due to the success of 
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communications with the Bucharest, the group decided that the fleet should contact all ships en 
route to Cuba to determine their cargo.
405
 At the urging of McNamara and McCone, Kennedy 
also authorized another series of low-level reconnaissance flights over the missile sites, airfields, 
naval ports, and the suspected nuclear storage sites.
406
 
McCone received a plethora of information from the U-2 and RF-8 reconnaissance flights 
throughout the day. The low-level flights showed that the Soviets had indeed started a crash 
program to complete construction on the MRBM sites.
407
 The photography also confirmed the 
presence of a nuclear storage site, probably completed between October 20 and 22. They also 
found two assembled IL-28 bombers, three under construction, and the crates present indicating 
an ability to construct twenty more. McCone provided this information to EXCOMM during the 
afternoon meeting, along with the list of Soviet ships approaching the Panama Canal from the 
Pacific.
408
 McCone noted that all ships underwent searches as they passed through the port, 
negating the need for a blockade of the canal as well. On the European front, McCone had no 
new intelligence on any “unusual developments in Europe.”409 McCone then passed the briefing 
on to Lundahl, who once again showed the photography gathered over the past day of flights.
410
  
The meeting then moved to diplomatic efforts in the United Nations. Rusk asked the 
group about the possibility of getting the missiles out of Cuba or at least place them under the 
control of the United Nations.
411
 He believed that if the government wished to negotiate with the 
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Soviets, it needed to keep the pressure on the Soviet Union. It was crucial in the next two days 
for the American delegation to convince the Soviets to stop the missile buildup in Cuba.
412
 If the 
decision came down to the Security Council vote, Rusk believed it would receive a seven-to-two 
vote; therefore, to keep the pressure on the Soviet Union during the negotiations, both 
McNamara and Rusk approved the tightening of the blockade to include non-military 
equipment.
413
 To limit the possibility of an incident, Rusk suggested the United States purchase 
the charter and cargo of any steamers en route to Cuba, and offer to let the captain and owner of 
the ship defect if needed. McCone agreed with Rusk‟s suggestion, because it would hinder the 
Soviet economy.
414
  
When the president joined the meeting, McNamara briefed him on the East German ship, 
the Voelker Freundschaft. It was currently beyond the quarantine line and being trailed by the 
destroyer USS Pierce.
415
 Because of the message from Secretary General U Thant to avoid any 
incidents until after talks concluded at the UN, Kennedy asked if the East German ship fell under 
the message‟s request.416 Bundy argued that U Thant‟s message did not cover the ship, while 
McNamara showed how difficult it was to stop a passenger ship.
417
  The group decided to allow 
the ship to pass through the blockade, but decided to tighten the blockade to keep up the pressure 
on the Soviet Union.
418
 It was at this point in the meeting that McCone “reported that some of 
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the strategic missiles deployed in Cuba are now operational.”419 With McCone‟s statement, the 
conversation moved from blockade options to the possibility of air strikes and invasion. The 
president then received a series of documents proposing a series of air strikes against the 
offensive missile bases and bombers, a complete blockade of all military aircraft and shipments 
to Cuba, and plans for an invasion of the island to remove Castro and the missiles.
420
 
Following the meeting, McCone received a message from Carter on a MONGOOSE 
operation scheduled for that week.
421
 Carter informed McCone that the main problem in using 
MONGOOSE plans was the jurisdictional issues between the intelligence community and the 
JCS.
422
 Carter noted that another problem was the length of time it took to approve operations 
under the MONGOOSE system, time not available in the current crisis.
423
 He confirmed that 
MONGOOSE secured 50 Cuban refugees to infiltrate the island prior to the invasion, to gather as 
much intelligence as possible.
424
 The problem was the operation proposed by General Edward 
Lansdale
425
 had severe logistical problems.
426
 In addition, the Cubans assigned to the operation 
had their own interests in mind, and not that of the greater U.S. strategy for the invasion.
427
 
Carter noted that despite these problems, planning continued on the operation. The preliminary 
plan for the operation included reconnaissance of the MRBM and IRBM sites, collecting data 
and establishing a network to deliver that information. Because of the nature of the crisis at that 
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point, Carter believed that the operation had moved beyond the Special Group level, making it 
difficult to utilize the MONGOOSE plans.
428
  
The Joint Committee‟s daily evaluation released early on October 26 did little to ease 
McCone‟s mind about the problems preparing for an invasion. The board analyzed the nine low-
level flights as well as the single U-2 flight. While the photography of the low-level flights of 
October 25 showed no new missile sites, it did show that Soviets were in a crash building 
program at four of the MRBM sites, “directed toward achieving a full operational capability as 
soon as possible.”429 The photography also confirmed that the Soviets had made no noticeable 
effort to dismantle the missile sites and had actually increased their camouflaging efforts over 
critical equipment. Thankfully, the photography from the low-level flights showed no additional 
missiles, vehicles, or launch equipment at the missile sites.
430
 The group believed that the heavy 
rains of the prior day kept the Soviets from activating the San Cristobal missile site.
431
 However, 
they expected the site to be operational sometime that day.
432
 The photography also confirmed 
that three of the Soviet ships believed to be transporting missiles continued their course towards 
the Soviet Union.
433
 
Early on the morning of Thursday, October 26, McCone received the CIA‟s briefing on 
the intelligence received during the night.
434
 McCone once again briefed EXCOMM on that 
intelligence, which included the present course of several Soviet ships and aircraft en route to 
Cuba, status of the Soviet armed forces, and the Soviet response to the UN‟s call for 
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negotiations.
435
 As of 6:00 AM that morning, McCone confirmed that two Soviet freighters and 
five tankers remained on course for Cuba.
436
 One of the freighters, the Belovodsk, carried up to 
twelve Mi-4 helicopters
437
, and was currently in the North Atlantic.
438
 The other remaining 
freighter, the Pugachev, was near the Panama Canal, and appeared to have stopped or slowed its 
progression to Cuba.
439
 According to the CIA reports, McCone believed that the Soviets and its 
satellites had increased their alert status, but made no major changes in deployment of forces in 
Europe. On the political front, sources in the Soviet Union confirmed that Khrushchev accepted 
U Thant‟s proposal for U.S.-Soviet negotiations.440 McCone noted that the decision to enter 
negotiations angered Chinese officials, who wanted a stronger response from the Soviets to the 
crisis.
441
 McCone then informed the president that he halted a CIA operation that used 
submarines to deliver fifty Cuban refugees to the island, pending discussions by the group. 
Kennedy believed that the Special Group should study the proposal that day, suggesting that the 
group reintroduce MONGOOSE as part of EXCOMM‟s deliberations.442 Kennedy believed that 
the JCS and the CIA needed to coordinate all existing plans for possible covert activities as a 
prelude to invasion. McCone then informed the president that the location of the SS Oxford, one 
of the CIA‟s communications ships, left it open to attack from the Cuban mainland.443 Kennedy 
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stated that the “Navy should have the authority to control this ship, but it should take into 
account CIA‟s concern.”444 
McNamara urged the president to issue a statement informing the Soviets of the 
continuation of surveillance flights over Cuba because of the Soviet decision to continue 
construction on the missile sites. He wanted both day and night reconnaissance flights to 
challenge the Soviet air defenses, including dropping flares during the night flights.
445
 When 
asked his opinion, McCone informed the group that the USIB had recommended against night 
reconnaissance flights.
446
 Rusk also questioned the effect that night missions might have on the 
negotiations at the UN.
447
 When McNamara promoted the issue of a warning about the flights, 
Stevenson supported Rusk‟s position on the issue. Due to the efforts of McCone, Rusk, and 
Stevenson, the president authorized the daylight missions but delayed the night missions.
448
 
EXCOMM discussed the objectives of the UN negotiations for that day, including forcing a 
commitment from the Soviets to halt construction, halt further shipments, and removing the 
existing missiles from Cuba. To accomplish these goals, the quarantine had to continue, and they 
had to increase the list of items on the embargo list.
449
 McCone argued that any decision the 
group made must end with the removal of both Castro and the missiles, because even if they 
removed the missiles, Castro still could undermine his Latin American neighbors.
450
 Kennedy, 
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Bundy, and Rusk agreed that their primary concern was the removal of the missiles from 
Cuba.
451
  
Following the EXCOMM meeting, McCone attended a MONGOOSE meeting with the 
Special Group.
452
 Because of the rift forming between Lansdale and the CIA, McCone held the 
meeting to coordinate MONGOOSE operations with the JCS plans for the invasion of Cuba.
453
 
McCone argued that because they designed MONGOOSE to create uprisings in Cuba to remove 
Castro from power, it must remain subordinate to the invasion plans.
454
 He quelled any belief 
that the CIA failed to give Lansdale the support he needed by confirming that Lansdale would 
continue as director of the operation.
455
 However, the changes brought by the crisis meant that 
covert operations needed to compliment invasion strategies, so the military would assume some 
of the responsibilities previously assigned to MONGOOSE.
456
 While many of the responsibilities 
shifted to the military, McCone and the rest of the Special Group confirmed that Lansdale was to 
be in charge of all covert activities in Cuba.
457
 They charged Lansdale to analyze the needs of the 
government and formulate a procedures based on his available assets.
458
 
The strain on McCone and other members of the administration became apparent during 
the long Friday deliberations.
459
 McCone feared that the continued strain might affect their 
emotional states, especially after the president authorized the State Department to prepare plans 
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for an interim Cuban government once the invasion commenced.
460
 McCone argued that the 
group should understand that an invasion was “a much more serious undertaking than most 
people had previously realized.”461 When the Navy successfully boarded the freighter Marcula, 
the intensity of the situation kept the group from lifting “the feeling of gloom that was settling 
over our committee and its deliberations.”462  
Throughout the day on Friday, McCone and the other members of EXCOMM continued 
preparations for an invasion. At the same time, Roger Hilsman, the Director of the Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research, received a message from John Scali, an ABC news correspondent.
463
 
In his message, Scali told Hilsman of a meeting with Alexander Fomin
464
 earlier that morning, 
where Fomin asked if the State Department might be interested in settling the Cuban crisis by 
dismantling the missile sites in return for an American pledge not to invade Cuba.
465
 Hilsman 
passed this message to the president, who met with select members of EXCOMM to question the 
proposal.
466
 McCone urged caution, because he believed, “No Soviet official of that rank could 
make such a suggestion without Khrushchev‟s approval.”467 After Kennedy sent his reply to 
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Khrushchev confirming his acceptance of the proposal, the group spent the rest of the afternoon 
awaiting the Kremlin‟s reply.468 
When Khrushchev‟s message arrived at 6:00, EXCOMM gathered to analyze the 
document. The group agreed it was a very emotional and personal letter written by Khrushchev 
intended to end the threat of nuclear war.
469
 Khrushchev promised to remove the weapons 
presently in Cuba and end further arms shipments to the island. He would only do this in 
exchange for the end of the American blockade of Cuba and a promise not to invade Cuba.
470
 
The members of EXCOMM continued their examination of the document into the early morning 
hours, after which the group decided to allow the State Department to prepare its own analysis 
because of their emotional and physical condition. The president requested that intelligence 
sources have their analysis ready for the Saturday morning EXCOMM meeting.
471
  
The hope felt by many of EXCOMM‟s members faded when Washington received 
another statement from the Soviet government.
472
 The second letter added the removal missiles 
in Turkey to the original agreement, which severely complicated the political situation and 
increased the intensity of the crisis. 
473
 The intelligence reports coming from Cuba did little to 
calm nerves.
474
 Early Saturday morning, the Joint Committee released its report that five of the 
MRBM sites were operational, and could launch all their missiles within six to eight hours.
475
 
Despite Khrushchev‟s letter, photography showed no halt to construction on the missile sites.476 
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Another U-2 photographed a FROG missile launcher near Remedios, and a probable nuclear 
storage bunker adjacent to the launchers at each site.
477
 Intelligence failed to determine if the 
ships approaching the blockade changed their course during the night or the status of Soviet 
troops.
478
 CIA intelligence sources also reported on the mobilization of Cuban and Soviet units 
in Cuba, but stipulated that these units were under orders not to take action unless the United 
States attacked.
479
 Other intelligence reports confirmed the activation of all twenty-four SAM 
sites, and the presence of Soviet submarines near the quarantine line.
480
  
The tense situation reached its breaking point on Saturday, October 27.  McCone started 
the meeting once again with a briefing on current intelligence.
481
 After McCone informed 
EXCOMM that most of the MRBMs were operational, most of the members “seemed to be 
holding their breath.”482 McNamara also confirmed that the freighter Graznyy was closing on the 
blockade line, and he recommended that the Navy intercept it.
483
 To warn the Soviets against 
approaching the line, the president requested that U Thant inform the Soviet delegation of the 
established quarantine line.
484
 When McNamara asked for more intelligence missions, Kennedy 
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authorized two missions for that day.
485
 However, McCone countered McNamara‟s request for 
night missions, because of Carter and Lundahl‟s reports that it would have no great benefit to the 
intelligence mission.
486
 Kennedy chose to keep the flights grounded for the time being, but he 
requested they remain on standby in case he needed to alter the plans.
487
 The group then 
discussed the missile bases in Turkey. Ball and Paul Nitze
488
 argued that removing the missiles 
would be difficult politically.
489
 Nitze recommended that the group focus on Cuba, and not on 
the U.S. bases in other nations.
490
 Rusk and Bundy believed they should not link Cuba to Turkey, 
because the Soviet missiles remained in Cuba.
491
 The president noted that he considered removal 
of the missiles several days prior, but the second letter from the Soviets eliminated the possibility 
of quietly removing the missiles.
492
 Dillon believed that the second letter from the Soviets was a 
stalling tactic designed to give Soviet personnel time to complete construction on the MRBM 
sites.
493
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When Kennedy left the meeting with Sorensen, the rest of the group discussed how to 
handle the differences between Khrushchev‟s letter and the Soviet letter released afterwards.494 
The president believed that the primary goal must be to end the construction on the missile sites, 
and proposed opening negotiations with the Turkish government to remove the missiles.
495
 
McNamara and Rusk noted that while the nuclear warheads remained under U.S. control, the 
Turks owned the missiles.
496
 McCone argued that the missiles were obsolete, but wanted to add 
more ballistic submarine patrols if they decided to remove the missiles.
497
 Because of the 
political problems in removing the missiles, Kennedy believed that the missiles in Turkey were 
of great military value with the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.
498
 He proposed a meeting 
with the Turkish government to explain the situation and the possible need to remove the 
JUPITER missiles to stop a war.
499
 
Saturday afternoon created more problems for EXCOMM to consider. Rusk reported to 
the group that a U-2 penetrated Soviet airspace over Siberia because of a navigation error.
500
 
McNamara also reported that the Air Force aborted the first U-2 flight over Cuba because of a 
mechanical problem. Other reports also showed that the U-2 afternoon flight over Cuba 
encountered ground fire and was overdue.
501
 After discussing their response in negotiations with 
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the Soviets, the group also decided to send a letter to Khrushchev accepting his initial proposal 
and ignoring the second message‟s proposal to remove the missiles in Turkey.502 The letter also 
emphasized the American position that the Soviets must cease construction on the missiles.
503
 
At this point in the meeting, McCone received a report that the Soviets attacked a U-2 
with a SAM missile, destroying the aircraft and killing the pilot. After hearing this report, the 
group began a discussion on how and when to launch attacks on Cuba.
504
 McNamara 
recommended that the group examine the plans for air strikes against Cuba. Rusk “recommended 
that mobilization measures be authorized immediately.”505 General Taylor suggested that if the 
Soviets refused to stop construction, the president should implement operational plans to launch 
air strikes on Monday morning, followed by an invasion seven days later. McNamara believed 
that if the Soviets launched attacks against the reconnaissance aircraft on Sunday, the United 
States should launch immediate attacks against the SAM sites. The president agreed but refused 
to make a definite decision on how to attack the SAM sites.
506
 When the group asked about the 
status of Soviet forces, McCone confirmed that the East German forces remained in their 
defensive positions, and had made no advances towards Berlin.
507
 
The last hours of the crisis brought the United States and the Soviet Union from the brink 
of war to its successful conclusion. Kennedy ordered EXCOMM to hold another meeting later 
that evening. During that meeting, he approved the activation of several of the air force reserves. 
If the Soviets attacked the reconnaissance flights scheduled for Sunday, he authorized the Air 
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Force to destroy the SAM sites.
508
 Finally, if the Soviets continued construction, he would 
authorize the beginning of air strikes on Cuba for Monday morning. Later that night, the Joint 
Committee reported that all twenty-four MRBM launchers were operational, and the Soviets 
appeared to be dispersing their equipment to defend against air attacks.
509
 The photography also 
showed a nuclear storage site at each of the missile complexes, as well as the port possibly used 
to transport those warheads to the sites. The CIA confirmed that construction on the missile sites 
continued at a rapid pace, and that the Cuban military units remained at high alert.
510
 However, 
intelligence sources established that the Soviets had yet to change the deployment of their armed 
forces, which led McCone to believe that the Soviets wanted to avert the possibility of war by 
downplaying their traditional rhetoric against the United States. Khrushchev confirmed 
McCone‟s belief that the Soviets did not want to start a war when he made the decision to 
withdraw the missiles from Cuba on Sunday morning, October 28.
511
 
 Khrushchev‟s decision to withdraw the missiles from Cuba lowered the threat of war. 
Washington Times reporter James Reston referred to this moment as “following the normal 
pattern of the cold war. When one giant demonstrates its willingness to risk a major war…the 
other giant pulls back.”512 However, the American government required confirmation before it 
would lift the blockade. At the morning meeting of EXCOMM, Rusk congratulated the members 
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of the committee for their help in resolving the crisis.
513
 The group agreed to halt the 
reconnaissance flights scheduled for the day and prepared statements to the public and to the 
negotiators at the United Nations.
514
 The group also ordered McCone to release all pertinent 
intelligence information to the UN delegation and send CIA experts along to answer any 
questions.
515
 To protect the intelligence sources and his deputies, he authorized Cline to send Bill 
Tidwell
516
 and Colonel David Parker
517
 to conduct the briefing.
518
 He also wanted to protect the 
intelligence sources used in the crisis and convinced EXCOMM to send older intelligence 
photographs to the UN.
519
 McCone believed that the United States needed to maintain its 
pressure on the Soviet Union during the negotiations, in order to maintain their position until the 
Soviets removed the missiles.
520
 Over the next several days, McCone pushed EXCOMM to 
continue surveillance of Cuba to determine if the Soviets were removing the missiles from 
Cuba.
521
 On November 1, when the Air Force grounded the remaining Agency U-2s, McCone 
pushed EXCOMM to allow the flights to continue.
522
 When some members of EXCOMM 
viewed reports from refugees that the Soviets had indeed began removing the missiles, McCone 
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pushed for more reconnaissance flights to confirm the information. Finally, on November 2, the 
photography confirmed the dismantling of the missiles, officially ending the crisis.
523
 
 McCone spent much of the time after the president‟s public address receiving the most up 
to date intelligence to bring to EXCOMM meetings. McCone had the important task of briefing 
members of the press and Congress on the situation. He also provided deputies to answer 
questions during the UN talks, despite his personal belief that the talks hurt the diplomatic 
standing of the United States. Thanks largely to the changes he made to the intelligence process 
during the first week of the crisis, he provided the first reports of the course changes in Soviet 
ships, giving Kennedy the time to halt any action against those ships. When McCone realized the 
strain on himself and the rest of the EXCOMM, he had his deputies prepare detailed intelligence 
memorandums containing the most recent intelligence reports. These groups allowed McCone to 
confirm for EXCOMM that while the Soviets continued construction, their armed forces 
remained in their defensive posture, eliminating some of the concern within the group. When 
Khrushchev chose to remove the missiles, McCone protected the intelligence sources and his 
deputies from the public eye, which allowed those sources to continue their efforts to determine 
whether the Soviet was withdrawing the missiles. His management during the last days of the 
crisis allowed the group to maintain detailed surveillance on the removal of the missiles, and 
pinpoint definitively that the Soviets were removing the missiles. 
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CONCLUSION 
 John McCone had a profound impact on the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the 
establishment of intelligence committees during the crisis, and the gathering of intelligence 
following the crisis. During the summer and fall of 1962, he maintained that the Soviet Union 
might place nuclear weapons into Cuba.
524
 He believed that Khrushchev wanted to place missiles 
in Cuba as a way to solve the Soviet Union‟s strategic goals and secure Castro‟s communist 
government.
525
 McCone made his concerns clear to President Kennedy and other members of the 
administration before leaving on his honeymoon in late August 1962. During his honeymoon, he 
called for more reconnaissance flights over Cuba, and remained informed of the situation 
through his deputy. When he returned from his honeymoon, he still found gaps in the 
reconnaissance over western portions of Cuba and immediately requested more overflights.
526
 
After the president finally authorized more, the October 14 flight discovered several Soviet 
missiles in Cuba.  Because of McCone‟s “crusade”527 during the summer and fall of 1962, the 
United States confirmed that the Soviet Union had placed nuclear missiles in Cuba. 
When McCone learned of the October 14 U-2 flights, he wanted the Kennedy 
administration to remove Castro and his communist government from power. McCone joined 
several prominent members of EXCOMM in proposing a surgical strike against missile sites 
followed by an invasion.
528
 During the first days of the crisis, McCone favored immediate action 
against Cuba, but realized that the blockade best served their immediate goals while limiting the 
risk of war. McCone provided daily intelligence reports in EXCOMM meetings, keeping 
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Kennedy and his cabinet informed on construction efforts in Cuba.
529
 He expedited the time 
between receiving intelligence reports from Cuba by creating several intelligence committees 
and delegating his authority to his deputies, Carter, Cline, and Lundahl. McCone also briefed 
Eisenhower on the situation, and reported to Kennedy on Eisenhower‟s recommendations. 
McCone‟s efforts to coordinate and integrate intelligence reports permitted the president to have 
a detailed picture on the status of the Soviet missiles, allowing him to make informed 
decisions.
530
  Kennedy based much of his decision on blockading Cuba on the recommendations 
from McCone and the rest of EXCOMM.
531
 
After Kennedy‟s address to the nation on October 22, McCone spent much of the time 
gathering intelligence reports and evaluations to bring to his meetings with EXCOMM. He also 
briefed members of the press and Congress on the president‟s decision to launch a blockade. 
During the negotiations with the Soviet Union, he provided deputies to answer questions during 
the UN talks, despite his personal belief that the talks hurt the standing of the United States. 
Because of the changes he made to the intelligence process during the first week of the crisis, he 
provided the first reports of the course changes in Soviet ships, giving Kennedy the time to halt 
any action against those ships. When the strain started to affect his decisions, McCone had his 
deputies prepare detailed intelligence memorandums containing the most recent intelligence 
reports. The groups McCone established allowed him to confirm for EXCOMM that while the 
Soviets continued construction, their armed forces remained in their defensive posture. When 
Khrushchev chose to remove the missiles, McCone protected the intelligence sources and his 
deputies from the public eye, which allowed those sources to continue their efforts to determine 
whether the Soviet was withdrawing the missiles. His management of the intelligence sources 
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during the last days of the crisis allowed those sources to maintain a detailed surveillance of the 
removal of the missiles, and pinpoint definitively that the Soviets were removing them. 
When the crisis ended in the 1962, scholars focused on the reasons why the crisis 
happened.
532
 The historians of this period relied on interviews, memory, and previous surprise 
attacks on the United States as evidence for their conclusions.
533
 In the late 1960s and 1970s, 
members of EXCOMM began to release memoirs on the crisis, and actual intelligence training to 
emphasize the timeline, intelligence methods, and the problems facing the Kennedy 
administration during the crisis.
534
 In the 1980s, the release of several more memoirs and 
classified documents allowed historians to construct detailed pictures of the event.
535
  After the 
Cold War ended in 1991, both the United States and the Soviet Union released several 
declassified documents, which led to a resurgence in scholarship.
536
 The new scholarship that 
emerged in the period focused on the mindset of government officials, the Soviet motivations for 
their actions, and the steps the Soviet Union took to keep their operation in Cuba a secret.
537
  
Despite the importance of McCone‟s role in the intelligence community and the 
EXCOMM, no historical works focus on connecting his influence before, during, and after the 
crisis. Most historians viewed McCone as the primary reason that the United States found the 
missiles, but otherwise focused their studies on the larger crisis itself. While McAuliffe‟s CIA 
Documents provide many of the CIA‟s internal memorandums, it does not contain all the 
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sources. The Foreign Relations of the United States database offers the transcripts of EXCOMM 
meetings and official memorandums, but suffers from the lack of context similar to McAuliffe. 
The personal memoirs from EXCOMM participants and intelligence officials give insight into 
the mindset and actions of the participants, but remain limited in their interpretations. Even with 
the declassified documents, memoirs, and histories on the crisis, nothing connects McCone‟s 
participation from the discovery of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba to the resolution of the 
crisis. 
When the majority of the intelligence community and the government failed to predict 
the introduction of missiles into Cuba, McCone pressed for a re-evaluation of that belief. When 
the president needed a group of advisors to help make decisions on the crisis, McCone served as 
one of the key members of that group. He established new intelligence committees to expedite 
the release of that information to Washington, allowing Kennedy to make informed decisions in 
Cuba. When Khrushchev made the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba, McCone took on 
the responsibility of overseeing the intelligence sources he created during the crisis to determine 
if indeed the Soviets were removing the missiles from Cuba. Because of his personal efforts to 
discover the truth behind the buildup in Cuba and the role he took during the crisis, McCone‟s 
involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis is one of the key facets to understanding how the crisis 
began and the role the U.S. government had in ending the conflict. 
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